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Abstract
An interactive proof involves two parties, the prover and the verifier. The goal of
the proof is for the prover to convince the verifier that some instance of a decision
problem is true. A zero-knowledge proof is an interactive proof where the only
information learned by the verifier of the proof is the outcome of the proof. This
thesis contains a theoretical overview of interactive and zero-knowledge proofs
and describes experiments with implementations of some of them.
Two examples of interactive proofs from number theory are given, a protocol
for quadratic non-residues and a protocol for subgroup non-membership. The
third example of an interactive proof is a protocol for determining the truth
value of a quantified Boolean formula. This interactive proof was implemented
and the details of that implementation, plus a test of the implementation derived
from game theory, are included. There is also a discussion of quantum interactive
proofs. The two examples of perfect zero-knowledge proofs that are included are
protocols for quadratic residues and for subgroup membership. These protocols
were also implemented, and those details are included.
For each protocol, there is a discussion of the complexity status of the prob
lems addressed by the protocol. There is also a brief discussion of the history
and applications of interactive and zero-knowledge proofs.
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Before the definitions of interactive and zero-knowledge proofs are introduced,
the reader should be familiar with the complexity status of the problems ad
dressed by the protocols. In order to discuss the complexity status of these
problems, it is necessary for the reader to understand a few key concepts of
computational complexity theory.
1.1 Definitions
The complexity of decidable problems can be thought of in two ways: in terms
of the time the problem requires or in terms of the space, or memory, that the
problem requires. Both time and space complexity are measured in terms of n,
the size of the input to the problem. First, we will discuss time complexity.
P is the class of all languages that are decidable in polynomial time on a
deterministic Turing Machine; in other words, it is the set of languages that are
decidable by 0(nk) time Turing Machines, where k is any non-negative integer
[Sipser, 235]. P represents the set of problems that can be realistically solved
using a computer.
NP is the class of all languages that are decidable in polynomial time on a
non-deterministic TuringMachine [Sipser, 244]. NP can also be thought of as the
class of languages that can be verified by a polynomial time deterministic Turing
Machine; in other words, the languages for which the membership relation can
be realistically verified using a computer [Sipser, 243].
It is clear that P C NP, since any language that can be decided by a polyno
mial time deterministic Turing Machine can clearly be verified by such a Turing
Machine. It has been conjectured that P ^ NP, but this has not been proven.
NP is thought to contain languages that are not in P because an enormous
amount of effort has been spent trying to find polynomial time algorithms for
specific problems in NP without any success [Sipser, 247].
A language is NP complete if G NP, and for every
'
NP, there
exists a polynomial transformation from to
'
[Sipser, 253]. A polynomial
transformation from j C EJ to 2 C
Y,*
is a function / : EJ - E? such that
there is a polynomial time deterministic TuringMachine which computes /, and
Vx E^ a; 1 if and only if f(x) 2 [Garey,34].
The idea of NP completeness is important because if P ^ NP, then there can
not exist a polynomial time algorithm for deciding any NP complete language.
Also, if a polynomial time algorithm is found for any NP complete language,
then the hierarchy collapses, and P = NP [Sipser, 248].
Now, we will move to the idea of space complexity. PSPACE is defined as
the set of all languages that are decidable in polynomial space on deterministic
Turing Machines [Garey, 170]. PSPACE is the space complexity analog of P.
The analog of NP, NPSPACE, is defined in a similar way. It turns out that
NPSPACE = PSPACE, since any non-deterministic Turing Machine, which uses
f(n) space, can be converted to a deterministic TuringMachine, which uses only
/2(n) of space [Sipser, 279]. This is clearly still polynomial space.
P C PSPACE since an polynomial-time machine can not use more than
polynomial space [Sipser, 282]. For the same reason NP C NPSPACE. The
relationships between the classes of languages are then as follows:
PCNPC PSPACE = NPSPACE,
and both of the inclusions are conjectured to be strict.
PSPACE completeness is defined in the same way as NP completeness. A
language is PSPACE complete if for all
'
PSPACE, there exists a polyno
mial transformation from to
'
[Garey, 171].
1.2 Complexity Status of Problems Addressed
by Protocols
Now that the necessary concepts of complexity theory have been introduced, we
can discuss the status of the problems addressed by the protocols used in this
thesis. One of the fundamental assumptions made by the protocols is that the
problem of factoring large numbers is hard. There is no known polynomial time
algorithm for factoring large numbers, even though there has been extensive
research in this area [Sipser, 339]. The complexity is measured in terms of
log2 n, since this is the number of digits needed to represent the integer n.
Many of the current cryptographic protocols, including RSA, are based on this
assumption.
The problem of quadratic residues is posed as follows: given n and a, does
there exist an x such that
x2 = a mod n? If x exists, then a is a quadratic
residue modulo n. This problem is solvable in polynomial time if n is prime, or
if the factorization of n is known. But, if n is composite and the factorization
is unknown, then the problem of quadratic residues is not known to be in P
[Garey, 249].
The problem of subgroup membership is posed as follows: given n, a, and 6,
does there exist a k such that b = ak mod n? If fc exists, then b is an element of
the subgroup of
Z*
generated by a. Finding k is equivalent to computing the
discrete logarithm:
loga b mod n.
There is no known polynomial time algorithm for computing discrete logarithms,
and if there was such an algorithm, then we would have the ability to factor
numbers in polynomial time [Schneier, 262].
The last problem that the protocols address is determining the truth value
of a quantified Boolean formula (QBF). The problem is posed as follows: given
a set of Boolean variables {ij ,2, . . . , in} and a well-formed QBF
B = Qix1Q2x2...QnXn E(xi,x2,.-.,xn),
where Qi {V, 3} and E is a quantifier-free Boolean expression, is B true? This
problem is PSPACE complete, and a proof of this can be found in [Sipser, 284-
287]. If the QBF is in conjunctive normal form with no more than two literals
per clause, then the problem is solvable in polynomial time [Garey, 262].
Chapter 2
Interactive Proofs
Let P be a decision problem, then an interactive proof for P involves two parties,
the prover (Peggy) and the verifier (Vic). Peggy is trying to convince Vic that
she knows whether or not the given x P. At the end of the proof Vic should
be convinced that Peggy is either telling the truth or she is not. This process is
made up of rounds. Each round consists of a challenge by Vic and a response
by Peggy. In each round, Peggy and Vic alternately do the following: receive
a message, do a computation, and send a message. At the end of the process,
Vic either accepts or rejects Peggy's proof. For the proofs that we wil consider,
Peggy has unlimited computational power, but Vic is limited to polynomial time
algorithms.
An interactive proofmust meet two conditions: completeness and soundness.
For an interactive proof to be complete, Vic will always accept Peggy's proof if
x is a yes-instance of the decision problem. The proof will be sound if there is
only a small probability that Vic will accept Peggy's proof if x is a no-instance
of the decision problem. In other words, the interactive protocol becomes an
interactive proof if the probability ofType I error, a, is zero, and the probability
of Type II error, /3, is small. 0 can be reduced arbitrarily close to zero by
iterating the process a certain number of times.
2.1 Number Theoretical Examples
2.1.1 Quadratic Non-Residues




has no solutions for x Z*. Currently, there does not exist a polynomial time
algorithm which decides if a is a quadratic non-residue modulo n; therefore, Vic
would not be able to decide this problem on his own. He can decide the problem
with the help of Peggy by using an interactive proof. Figure 2.1 describes an
interactive proof for quadratic non-residues.
Input: An integer n with unknown factorization n = pq, where p and q are prime,
and x Z*, where x is a quadratic non-residue modn.
1. Repeat the following steps log2 n times:






chooses i {0, 1} at random. He sends z = x'y mod n to Peggy.
(b) If z is a quadratic residue modulo n, then Peggy defines j = 0;
otherwise, she defines j = I. Peggy sends j to Vic.
(c) Vic checks to make sure that i = j
2. Vic accepts Peggy's proof, that x is a quadratic non-residue mod n, if step
c is verified in each of the log2 n rounds.
Figure 2.1: Interactive Proof for Quadratic Non-Residues [Stinson, 408]
To prove that this proof is an interactive proof, it needs to be shown that
the proof is complete and sound. The proof is complete if for every x that is a
quadratic non-residue, Vic will always accept Peggy's proof.
Theorem 2.1 The protocol in Figure 2.1 provides a complete prooffor quadratic
non-residues.
Proof: Assume that x is a quadratic non-residue and that Vic re
jects the proof. If Vic rejects the proof, then i ^ j in at least one of
the log2 n rounds. If i ^ j, then either
1. z is a quadratic residue and z =
xv2
mod n, or
2. z is quadratic non-residue and z =
v2
mod n.
The second case is an obvious contradiction by the definition of
quadratic non-residue, so this leaves only the first case to prove.
If z is a quadratic residue, then there exists a w Z*, such that
w2 =













This is a contradiction since x is a quadratic non-residue modulo
n. Note that
V1
exists since v Z*. Since both cases caused
contradictions, the assumption must
be false: If x is a quadratic
non-residue, then Vic will always accept
Peggy's proof; therefore,
the proof is complete.
Soundness is proved by showing that if a; is a quadratic residue modulo n,
then the probability that Vic accepts
Peggy's proof is very small.
Theorem 2.2 The protocol in Figure 2.1 provides a sound proof for quadratic
non-residues.
Proof: x is a quadratic residue modulo n; therefore, there exists a
w Z*, such that
w2
=
x mod n. Peggy will always send j = 0 in
step b since if i - 0, then z =
v2










and therefore, z is a quadratic residue in both cases. Since j always
equals zero, the probability of i being equal to j is the same as
the probability of i being zero. Since i is chosen at random from
{0, 1}, the probability of i being zero is one-half. This procedure
is repeated log2 n times; therefore, the probability of Vic accepting
Peggy's proof if x is a quadratic residue is
This means that for large n the protocol for quadratic non-residues
is sound.
By Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2, the protocol for quadratic non-residues,
as presented in Figure 2.1, is an interactive proof since it is both complete and
sound.
2.1.2 Subgroup Non-Membership
The second example of interactive proofs asks the question, is 6 a member of the
subset of
Z*
generated by a? In other words, does there exist a
k {0, 1, . . . , m 1}, such that b =
ak
mod n, if a, 6
Z*
and a has order
m in Z*? As with the problem of quadratic non-residues, there is no known
polynomial time algorithm for deciding if there exists such a k, so Vic needs to
use an interactive proof to decide this problem. The proof in Figure 2.2 is an
interactive proof for subgroup non-membership, the case when the answer to
the above question is no.
Note that even though n is large,
ak
can be computed efficently by using
binary exponentiation. Using the square-and-multiply algorithm, as presented
in [Stinson, 127], this calculation can be done in polynomial time. Also notice
that m should be a number less than <j)(n), since
Va
Z*
a^n) = 1 mod n.
If m = <j>(n) then the subgroup generated by a is Z*, and b will always be a
subgroup member.
Theorem 2.3 and Theorem 2.4 state the completeness and soundness of this
proof, and therefore, verify that the proof is an interactive proof.
6
Input: A positive integer n and two distinct elements a, 6 Z*, where the order
of a is denoted by m and is publicly known.
1. Repeat the following steps log2n times:





and sends g to Peggy.
(b) If g =
ak
modn, where A; 6 {0,1,...,m - 1}, then Peggy defines
t = 0; otherwise, she defines t = 1. Peggy sends t to Vic.
(c) Vic checks to make sure that i = t.
2. Vic accepts Peggy's proof, that b is not a member of the subgroup of
Z*
generated by a, if step c is verified in each of the log2 n rounds.
Figure 2.2: Interactive Proof for Subgroup Non-Membership
Theorem 2.3 The protocol in Figure 2.2 provides a complete prooffor subgroup
non-membership.
Proof: Show that if b is not a member of the subgroup of
Z*
gen
erated by a, then Vic will always accept Peggy's proof for subgroup
non-membership. Assume that b is not a member, and that Vic re
jects Peggy's proof. Vic will only reject the proof if for at least one
of the log2 n rounds i ^ t. This means that either
1. g
= a) mod n and g ^
ak
mod n, for all k 0, 1, . . . , m 1, or
2. g
= a-7 6 mod n and g =
ak
mod n, for some k 0, 1, . . . , m 1.
The first case is clearly a contradiction. This leaves the second case:
g









This is also a contradiction, since we assumed that b was not a
member of the subgroup generated by a. Since both cases lead to
contradictions, the initial assumption is wrong; therefore, if b is not a
member of the subgroup generated by a then Vic will always accept
Peggy's proof. This proves the completeness of the protocol for
subgroup
non-membership.
Theorem 2.4 The protocol in Figure 2.2 provides a sound proof for subgroup
non-membership.
Proof: Show that if 6 is a member of the subgroup of
Z*
generated
by a, then there is only a small probability that Vic will accept
Peggy's proof for subgroup non-membership. Vic only accepts the
proof if i = t for all log2 n rounds. Since 6 is a subgroup member,
b = ak mod n, for some fc {0, 1, . . . , m - 1}. Peggy will always
send t = 0 in step b, since either g = a? mod n or




= aj+k mod m
mod
n.
and therefore, g is a subgroup member. Since t always equals zero,
i will always equal t whenever i equals zero. The probability of
i being zero is one-half, since i is chosen at random from {0,1}.
This procedure is repeated log2 n times; therefore, as seen before,
the probability of Vic accepting Peggy's proof, if 6 is a member of
the subgroup generated by a, is 1/n. This means the protocol for
subgroup non-membership is sound.
2.2 Quantified Boolean Formulas
A third example of an interactive proof is a protocol for determining the truth
value of a quantified Boolean formula. Some definitions and theorems are needed
before the proof can be presented. The information in Section 2.2.1 and Sec
tion 2.2.2 can be found in more detailed form in [Shamir].
2.2.1 Preliminary Information
The class of quantified Boolean formulas (QBF) is defined as the closure of the
set of Boolean variables (x;) and their negations (xi) under the operations A
(and), V (or), Vxj (universal quantification), and 3xj (existential quantification).
It is not required that all quantifiers appear in a leftmost prefix [Shamir, 870].
A QBF is considered closed if all its variables are quantified. The truth
value of a closed QBF can be evaluated. A convenient measure of the size of
a QBF is the number of distinct variables that the QBF contains. A closed
QBF is simple if every occurrence of each variable is separated from its point
of quantification by at most one universal quantifier [Shamir, 870]. By this
definition,
Vxi3x2[(xi Vxj) Wx3(xi AX3)]
is simple. The first instance of x\ is separated from its point of quantification
by no universal quantifiers, and the second instance is separated only by VX3.
The instances of x2 and X3 are separated from their points of quantification by
no universal quantifiers. On the other hand,
VxiVx2Vx3[(xi A x2) V x3]
is not simple since xi is separated from its point of quantification by both Vx2
and Vx3. Even though this definition seems to restrict the power of QBF's, it
can be proved that:
Theorem 2.5 Every QBF of size n can be transformed into an equivalent sim
ple QBF whose size is polynomial in n [Shamir, 870].
Closed QBF's can be transformed into arithmetic expressions by the follow
ing process, which Shamir calls arithmetization [Shamir, 871]:
1. Replace each occurrence of the Boolean variable Xj by a variable ZiE Z.
2. Replace each occurrence of xl by (1 zi).
3. Replace A (and) by (integer multiplication), V (or) by + (integer addi
tion), Vxj (universal quantification) by jTIz.eloi} (integer product), and
3x, (existential quantification) by S2i6/0 n (integer sum).
According to this process, the arithmetization of
Vxi3x2[(xi V X2) V Vx3(xi A X3)]
would be
n [(zi+(i _*,))+ n (Z1.Z3)].
Z1{0,1}226{0,1} 236{0,1}
From this definition of the process of arithmetization, Theorem 2.6 can easily
be proved by induction on the structure of QBF's:
Theorem 2.6 A closed QBF B is true if and only if the value of its arithmetic
form A is non-zero [Shamir, 871].
Theorem 2.6 can be proved by induction on the structure of B.
One problem with using the arithmetic form to find the truth value of the
QBF is that if the QBF is true, the value ofA can be very large, but Theorem 2.7
states that there exists an upper-bound to the value of A:
Theorem 2.7 LetB be a closed QBF of size n. Then the value of its arithmetic
form A can not exceed
C(2n"
) [Shamir, 871].
Using Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 2.7, it can be proved that the following equiv
alence is true, and therefore, the equivalence can be used to find the truth value
of a QBF:
Theorem 2.8 Let B be a closed QBF of size n. Then there exists a prime p of
length polynomial in n such thatAQ mod p if and ifB is true [Shamir, 872].
Definitions of the functional form and randomized form of a QBF are
also needed. Given a closed QBF B, the functional form
A'
of its arithmetic
expression A is found by eliminating the leftmost IlZie{o,i} or z;e{o,i}-
A>
is
then a polynomial function of one free variable, and this polynomial function
will be denoted gfo) [Shamir, 872]. By this definition, the functional form of
the QBF
B = Vxi3x2[(xi V xi) V Vx3(xi A x3)]
is
a'= e K* + a - **)) + n (*i-*3)i,
226(0,1} 236(0,1}




= ((^i + (l-0)) + (z1-0)(Zl-l)) + ((z1 + (l-l)) + (z1-0)(Zl 1))
= ((zj + 1) + 0) + ((zx + 0) + 0)
= 2zi + 1.
The randomized form of A is simply A'(zi = r), where r is a random element
of Zp [Shamir, 872]. The value ofA'fa = r) is q{r).
During the interactive proof, Peggy will need to split A into Ai and A2. This
is done by letting A\ be everything in A before the first riz;e{o,i} or X^e^.i}'
except the rightmost + or -, and letting A2 be everything after, and including,
the first I~Li(o 1} or Szje(o 1} [Shamir, 874]. For example, if Peggy is splitting
a = i+ C1-^).
226(0,1}
then
A = Ai+A2,Ai = l,andA2= ^Z (x ' z2),
226(0,1}
and if Peggy is splitting
A= J] E (*i+*a).
216(0,1} 226(0,1}
then A2 = A and Ai is empty.
2.2.2 Determining the Truth Value of a QBF
The interactive proof presented in Figure 2.3 takes a closed, simple QBF as
input and proves that the value of A, the arithmetic form of B, is a mod p,
where a is a non-negative integer and p is a prime that is polynomially long in
the size of B. If Peggy claims that a is zero, then the proof is determining the
truth value of the QBF B; if the proof accepts Peggy's claim then B is false,
otherwise B is true.
Since Vic is restricted to polynomial time algorithms, he is not capable of
deriving the polynomials q(zi) from A, and this is why Peggy is necessary in
the proof. The QBF B must be simple so that Vic is able to evaluate the
polynomials g(zj) in polynomial
time. If B was not required to be simple, Vic
10
Input: A closed, simple QBF B and the arithmetic form A.
1. Either Vic or Peggy choose a prime p that is polynomially long in the size
of B [Shamir, 872].
2. Peggy sends the claimed value a, of A mod p, to Vic.
3. While the algorithm is not done, repeat the following:
Vic splits A into Ai A2 or Ai + A2.
IF A2 is empty, the algorithm is finished and Vic accepts Peggy's claim
if and only if
a = ai mod p,
where a is the value of Ai .
ELSE IF Ai is non-empty, Vic sets
A = A2 mod p and a = a/a\ mod p or a = a ai mod p,
depending on if A is A\ A2 or A\ + A2. If
A = Ai A2 and ai = 0 mod p,
then the algorithm is finished and Vic accepts Peggy's claim if and
only if
a = 0 mod p.
ELSE Vic needs more information from Peggy.
(a) Peggy sends the polynomial description, q(z{) of
A1
to Vic.
(b) Vic checks that
a
=
q(0) q(l) mod p or a
=
g(0) + q(l) mod p,
depending on the first symbol of A2. If this fails, the algorithm
is finished, and Vic rejects Peggy's claim; otherwise, Vic sends a
random r Zp to Peggy and sets
A = A'(zi = r) mod p and a = q(r) mod p.
Figure 2.3: Interactive Proof for Determining the Truth Value of a Closed,
Simple QBF [Shamir, 874]
11
would not necessarily be able to evaluate the polynomial q(zt). For simple
QBF's Vic is guaranteed to be able to handle these polynomials because of the
following theorem:
Theorem 2.9 If B is simple, then the degree of the polynomial q{zi), that
describes the functional form of A, grows at most linearly with the size of B
[Shamir, 873].
Before the protocol given in Figure 2.3 is proved to be an interactive proof,
we will demonstrate a small numerical example of the protocol. If we let
B = Vxi3x2(xi Ax^),
then A, the arithmetized version of B, is
n e [*i-u-*2)].
216(0,1} 226{0,1}
In step 1, set p to 17, and in step 2, Peggy sends the claimed value of a, which
in this case will be 0. Now, step 3 is repeated until one of the ending conditions
is met.
In the first iteration Ai is empty and A2 = A, meaning that neither the if
nor the else if clause holds, and Vic must request more information from Peggy.
Peggy sends Vic
q(zi) =Zx.
Vic must check that a = q(0) q(l) mod p, since a universal quantifier was
removed to form A':
q(0) q(l)
= 0-l = 0 = a mod 17,
so this step checks. Vic then chooses a r at random. We will let r
= 5. He then
sets




a = o(5) = 5 mod 17.
Now, step 3 must be repeated. Again, Ai is empty and A2 = A, so Vic asks
Peggy for additional information. Peggy sends Vic
q(z2)
= 5 - 5z2.
Vic checks that a = q(0) + q(l) mod p, since the removed quantifier was exis
tential:
q(0) + q(l)
= (5 - 5 0) + (5
- 5 1) = 5 = a mod 17.
Since this step checked, Vic then chooses r, at random, to be 9, and sets
A = A'(z2 = 9) = [5 (1
-
9)] = -40 = 11 mod 17 and
a = q(9)
= (5 - 5 9) = -40 = 11 mod 17.
12
Repeating step 3 a final time, Ax = 11 and A2 is empty. This meets the if
condition, so Vic checks that a = ax mod p:
a = 11 = m mod 17.
This check is verified; therefore, Vic accepts Peggy's proof that the QBF B is
false.
Now that we have seen how the protocol works, it needs to be shown that
the protocol is an interactive proof. This is done by Theorem 2.10, which proves
completeness and soundness of the protocol.
Theorem 2.10 // Peggy chooses the prime p, then the protocol given in Fig
ure 2.3 provides a complete and sound proof for determining the truth value of
a closed, simple QBF.
Proof: The proof is complete since Peggy will always be able to
justify her claimed values and polynomials if she is telling the truth,
and Vic must accept the proof if Peggy justifies her claims at every
step [Shamir, 875]. Note that if Vic chooses the prime, the proof
does not have perfect completeness since if p is a divisor of the true
value of A, then B will appear to be false when in reality it is true
[Shamir, 872].
The proof is sound since if Peggy provides an incorrect value of a,
then she is forced to provide an incorrect polynomial q{z{) to support
her claim. An incorrect polynomial of degree t can agree with the
correct polynomial on at most t of the p values in Zp . Since the value
of p is exponential in the size of B and the value of r is chosen by
Vic, the probability is negligible that the incorrect q(zi) will yield a
correct value when q is evaluated at r. Peggy is therefore providing
incorrect values for smaller and smaller subexpressions, so there is a
exponentially small probability that Vic will not expose Peggy when
he evaluates the final subexpression. [Shamir, 875]
2.2.3 Implementation of the Interactive Proof
qbf is a program which implements the algorithm described in Figure 2.3. The
program should be thought of as Peggy, and the user should be thought of as
Vic. The only required input to the program is an input file which contains a
QBF. The QBF is assumed to be closed and simple, and it assumed to have
proper syntax. Vic has the option of providing the value a of the QBF. If Vic
does not choose a value for a, Peggy assumes it to be zero, making it a protocol
for non-membership in QBF. Vic also has the option to provide the value of p.
If p is chosen by Peggy, p will have one hundred digits.
The output of qbf is a transcript of the interactions between Peggy and Vic.
The inputs, the messages exchanged, and the outcome of the proof are printed
to the screen. Instances of QBF's which may lead to applications should have
at least 100 variables and 400 clauses. Sample runs of the program are found
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in Appendix B.l. The next section discusses the details of one of the formulas
used to test qbf .
2.2.4 QBF and a Pebbling Problem
Since QBF is PSPACE complete, interesting (i.e. difficult) instances of QBF's
can be found by transforming other PSPACE complete problems into QBF's.
Games are particularly suited for this purpose. One type of test case for the
program qbf was derived from the pebbling game. The pebbling game is played
on an acyclic, directed graph, where every node has at most two predecessors.
The player has a set of pebbles, and he can do one of the following at each time
step:
1. He can remove a pebble from any vertex at any time.
2. He can place a pebble on any unpebbled vertex v if and only if all the
predecessors of v are currently pebbled.
3. He can move a pebble to an unpebbled vertex v from a predecessor of v if
and only if all predecessors of v are currently pebbled.
The object of the game is to pebble a specified goal vertex [Gilbert, 513]. The
pebbling problem is defined as follows: "Given a graph G, can a vertex v in
G be pebbled using no more than s
pebbles?"
[Gilbert, 514]. This problem is
PSPACE complete, as proven in [Gilbert]; therefore, there is a transformation
from QBF to the pebbling problem.
A natural transformation can be devised if the QBF is in conjunctive normal
form, with exactly three literals per clause and all of the quantifiers in the prefix.
This means that the QBF is of the following form:
giXi<32x2...Qnxn((Zi,iVZi,2VZi,3)A(/2,iV/2,2Vi2,3)A...A(ZmilVim,2VZm,3)),
where Qi {V, 3}, Xj's are Boolean variables, ljtk {xj,x7}, n is the number of
quantifiers/variables, and m is the number of clauses. From this QBF, a graph
G can be constructed, with goal vertex qi, such that the QBF is true if and only
if qi can be pebbled with s
= 3n + 3 pebbles [Gilbert, 514].
A pyramid of vertices is defined as in Figure 2.4, and it can be abbreviated as
shown in the figure. It takes at least k pebbles to pebble a fc-pyramid [Gilbert,
515]. G consists oin + m blocks of vertices, one for each quantifier and one for
each clause in the formula. The universal and existential quantifier blocks, qi,
are shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, respectively. The block for each clause,
Pj, is shown in Figure 2.7. p0 is simply a single vertex, and pTO
= qn+x [Gilbert,
516].
Using the preceeding definitions the graph G, derived from
3xiVx23x3Vx43x5((x7Vx2~Vx3) A (x2 VxJVxi") A (xi Vx4 Vx5) A (x3 VxIVx?)),
is shown in Figure 2.8. The blocks for each of the five quantifiers are located on





o o o o o
o
Figure 2.4: A 5-pyramid [Gilbert, 515]
Figure 2.5: Universal Quantifier Block [Gilbert, 517]
Figure 2.6: Existential Quantifier Block [Gilbert, 517]
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JJO
Figure 2.7: Clause Quantifier Block [Gilbert, 517]
the graph. The edges from the quantifier blocks to the clause blocks represent
the occurrences of the variables in the clauses.
The proof that this process correctly produces a graph G such that the QBF
is true if and only if gi can be pebbled with s pebbles can be found in [Gilbert].
This example was one test case used in testing qbf , and the output from this
test can be found in Appendix B.l. qbf showed that the above QBF is true;
therefore, qi can be pebbled with eighteen pebbles.
Several other games, including Go and Hex, have been shown to be PSPACE
complete. Refer to [Garey] for a discussion of some games that are PSPACE and
NP complete. [Sipser] contains a detailed description of a transformation from
the game Geography to QBF. This transformation is very similar to the one we
have just described. Other examples of QBF's, created by Jussi Rintanen, can
be found at [Rintanen].
2.2.5 IP = PSPACE
IP is the set of all languages that have efficient interactive proofs ofmembership
[Shamir, 869]. Shamir has proved that IP and PSPACE are equivalent. Using
the fact that QBF is PSPACE complete, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.11 IP = PSPACE.
Proof: First, it needs to be shown that IP C PSPACE. This is easy
since every IP language is accepted by the PSPACE machine that
simply traverses the tree of all possible interactions between Peggy
and Vic [Shamir, 869]. This machine is a PSPACEmachine since the
depth of the tree is polynomial, and at each level only a polynomial
amount of memory is needed.
Second, it needs to be shown that PSPACE C IP. This is done by
using the IP for deciding QBF. The interactive proof presented here
requires that the QBF be closed and simple, but as we mentioned




Figure 2.8: Graph for 3xiVx23x3Vx43xs((xi V x2 V x3) A (x2 V X3 V xl) A (xi V
X4 VX5) A (X3 VxJVxjJ)), where the maximum number of pebbles allowed is 18
[Gilbert, 518].
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closed, simple QBF. Since there is an IP for every instance in QBF,
and QBF is PSPACE complete, then PSPACE C IP.
Since IP C PSPACE and PSPACE C IP, IP = PSPACE.
2.3 Quantum Interactive Proofs
Once quantum computers are built, the entire concept of tractability will likely
change. Because of this change in the definition of what is realistically com
putable, only some interactive protocols will remain secure. The idea of inter
active proof systems has been generalized to the idea of quantum computing
by giving a definition of quantum interactive proof systems. This idea is dis
cussed at length in [Watrous]. Also, an audio presentation of this paper and
other quantum computing information can be found at [AQIP99]. In this thesis,
quantum interactive proof systems will be defined, and a quantum interactive
proof for the truth value of a QBF will be given. First some definitions are
needed.
2.3.1 Preliminary Information
A quantum computer differs from a classical computer because the quantum
computer can not only read and write zeros and ones, but it can read and write
superpositions of zeros and ones simultaneously [Williams, 24]. A single bit of
a quantum computer, a qubit, is thought of as a vector within a sphere which
simultaneously measures the zero-ness and one-ness of the bit, as well as the
phase [Williams, 25]. The values |0) and |1) are written to correspond to the
bits 0 and 1. A quantum computer is built of quantum gates, which are the
same as regular gates, except they input and output qubits rather than bits.
Quantum circuits, which are made up of quantum gates, are reversible, and
the transformation from the inputs to the outputs is thought of as a unitary
operator [Williams, 44].
Quantum computers, when built, will have a dramatic impact on our con
cept of tractability. Peter Shor has developed efficent quantum algorithms for
factoring large integers and solving discrete logarithms on quantum computers
[Shor]. Since RSA and other cryptographic systems are based on the belief that
there is no efficent algorithm for these problems, new secure protocols will need
to be developed. This is also true for several interactive protocols, including the
ones discussed in this thesis. New methods of quantum cryptography are being
created to replace the methods that will become insecure once quantum com
puters are built. One such method was developed by Charles Bennett and Giles
Brassard [Bennett]. This method encodes messages using polarized photons,
and it obtains its security from the impossibility of cloning quantum informa
tion and from the consequences of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle [Williams,
164].
Quantum computers will also extend the realm of what is imaginable. Since
randomness is at the heart of nature, and hence at the heart of quantum physics,
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quantum computers will be able to generate true random numbers; whereas,
classical computers can only pretend to generate random numbers [Williams,
147-148]. Quantum computers will also make teleportation feasible. This is
done by exploiting the ideas of entanglement of states and non-logical influence
[Williams, 184]. Teleportation would provide an ultra-securemethod for sending
data, since the data would never need to cross a channel, it would simply be
teleported from one secure system to another [Williams, 185].
Now that we have seen the consequences of quantum computing, we are
ready to define the concept of a quantum interactive proof. A fc-round verifier
Vic is thought of as a polynomial time computable mapping
V:E*
x {0,l,...,fc}->E*,
where V(x, j) is an encoding of a quantum circuit. That circuit is made up of
quantum gates which are chosen from a universal set of gates which necessarily
includes the Walsh-Hadamard gate and a gate for reversible computation. Each
circuit V(x, j) must be polynomial in size. The circuit acts on two sets of qubits,
the message and the ancilla. The message is the communication line between
Vic and Peggy, and the ancilla is Vic's private information storage [Watrous,
3]. A fc-round prover Peggy is a mapping P from
E*
x {0, 1, . . . , k} to the set
of all quantum circuits. There are no restrictions on the complexity of P(x,j),
and P{x, j) also acts on two sets of qubits, the common message and her ancilla
[Watrous, 3].
An example of the pair (P, V) can be seen in Figure 2.9. The probability
that (P, V) accepts x is defined as the probability that the output qubit yields
|1) when the circuits are applied in sequence and all qubits are initially in the
|0) state [Watrous, 3]. A language has a fc-round quantum interactive proof
system, with error probability e, if there exists a fc-round verifier Vic such that:
1. There exists a fc-round prover Peggy such that for all x C, (P, V) accepts
x with probability one.
2. For all x
"
, and for all fc-round provers P', (P',V) accepts x with
probability at most e [Watrous, 3].
Before the quantum interactive proof for QBF is presented, another interactive
proof for QBF needs to be discussed because this interactive proof is used in
the quantum interactive proof for QBF.
2.3.2 Second Interactive Proof for QBF
The second interactive proof for determining the truth value of a QBF is due to
Shen, and the proof can be found in its original form in [Shen]. This thesis will
discuss a modification of Shen's proof from [Sipser, 364-366]. The proof requires
that the QBF <b be of the form
(j) = Q\X\Q2X2 ...QmXm B(xi,X2,...,Xm),
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output qubit
Figure 2.9: Quantum circuit for a two-round quantum interactive proof system
[Watrous, 4].
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where Qi {V, 3}, Xj's are Boolean variables, and B is a quantifier-free Boolean
formula, b is the polynomial associated with B found by using the following
algorithm:
1. Replace a with 1 - a.
2. Replace a A 8 with a 8.
3. Replace a V 8 with a*/3=l-(l- a)(l - 8).
This is similar to the process of arithmetization in Section 2.2.1, but the details
of the two processes are different. The value of b will agree with B when xt
{0,1} for allx^s [Shen, 878].
In order to complete the arithmetization of <f>, we write the expression





= SiyiS2y2 . . . Skyk B(xi,...,xm),
where Si {V, 3, R} and yi {xi, . . . , xm} [Sipser, 365]. Define fk to be b, and






















Note that the arguments have been arranged so that the last argument is j/j+i
and
" represents the values a\ through aj, for the appropriate value of j
[Sipser, 365]. The purpose of R is to reduce the degree of the variable to one.
The protocol for deciding the truth value of <f> is described in Figure 2.10.
Note that all operations are done over the field T, and the size ofT must be at
least d4, where d is the length of <f>. Refer to [Sipser, 366] or [Shen, 880] for a
proof that this protocol is an interactive proof.
To illustrate the protocol we will work through a small example. Let (j) be
defined as follows:




Since B{x\,x2) = xi Vxb",
b = xi * (1 -x2)
= l-(l-xi)(l-(l-x2))
= l-(l-xx)x2
= 1 X2 +XiX2.
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Input: A QBF 0 and a field T.
Phase 0: Peggy sends /o().
1. Peggy sends /0() to Vic.
2. Vic checks that f0() = 1, and rejects if not.
Phase i: Peggy persuades Vic that fi-iin ) is correct, given that /i(rx )
is correct.
1. Peggy sends the coefficents of
s(z)
= fi(ri---,z),
where rx is the setting of the previously selected random variables.




fi-i (ri , r) = (1
-
r)s(0) + rs(l) if S4_i = R.
If the check fails, Vic rejects; otherwise, Vic chooses r T and sends
r to Peggy. If Sj_i = R, then this r replaces the previous r.
Phase fc + 1: Vic checks that fk(ri, -,rm) is correct.
Vic checks that 6(ri, . . . ,rm) = /fc(ri, . . . ,rm). Vic accepts if and only if
they are equal.
Figure 2.10: Simplified Interactive Proof for Determining the Truth Value of a
QBF [Sipser, 365-366]
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Before Peggy can send /o, she must have calculated fi,f2,--, and fk, since
each fi depends on fi+\. This is the difficult part of the protocol, and this
computation is the reason Vic could not perform the protocol on his own. Before
we execute the protocol, we will calculate the fi's.
/s(xi,x2) = 6(xi,x2)
= 1 x2 + X\X2
/4(xi,x2) = Rx2f5{xi,x2)
= (l-x2)/5(xi,0)+x2/5(xi,l)
= (1 - X2) 1 + X2Xi




= 1 X2 + XiX2












Now, we can begin the protocol. Choose T to be Z17. This means that all
operations are performed mod17, and that every rj Zi7.
Phase 0:
1. Peggy sends /0() = 1.
2. Vic does not reject.
Phase 1:
1. Peggy sends s(z) = /i(z)
= 1.
2. Since Si = V, Vic checks that s(0) s(l)
= /0():
s(0) s(l)
= 1 1 = 1 = /o mod 17.
Vic chooses ri = 6.
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Phase 2:
1. Peggy sends s(z) = f2(z) = 1.
2. Since S2 = R, Vic checks that (1 -n)s(O) + ris(l) = A(ri):
(1-6) -1 + 6-1 = -5 + 6=1 = /i(6) mod 17.
Vic chooses n = 3, which replaces the old n .
Phase 3:
1. Peggy sends s(z) = h{rx,z) = 1 - z + 3z = 1 + 2z.
2. Since S3 = 3 Vic checks that s(0) * s(l) = /2(ri):
l-(l-(l + 2-0))(l-(l + 2-l))
= 1 - 0 -2 = 1 = /2(3) mod 17.
Vic chooses r2 = 11.
Phase 4:
1. Peggy sends s(z) = fi{rx,z) = 1 - z + 3z = 1 + 2z.
2. Since 54 = R Vic checks that (1 - r2)s(0) + r2s(l) = /3(n,r2):
(1 - 11)(1 + 2 0) + 11
- (1 + 2 1)
= -10 + 11 3 = 23 = 6 mod 17, and
/3(3, 11) = 1 + 2 11 = 23
= 6 mod 17.
Vic chooses r2 = 13.
Phase 5:
1. Peggy sends s(z) = /5(ri , z) = 1
- z + Zz = 1 + 2z.




(1-13)(1 + 2-0) + 13 -(1 + 2-1)
= -12 + 13 3 = 27 = 10 mod 17, and
/4(3, 13) = 1 + 2 13 = 27
= 10 mod 17.
Vic chooses r2 = 7.
Phase 6: Vic checks that 6(3,7)
= /5(3,7) mod 17:
6(3, 7) = 1
- 7 + 3 7 = -6 + 21 = 15 mod 17, and
/6(3,7) = 1 +
2-7= 15 mod 17;
therefore, Vic accepts Peggy's proof that <j> is true.
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Input: A QBF Q and a p x fc matrix R of elements in T.
1. Peggy prepares the superposition
2-nPkl2Y\R)\C(R))
R
in R and F. She copies R to S, and sends R and F to Vic.
2. Vic rejects if (R*, F,) contains an invalid proof that Q evaluates to true, for
anyi {1,2,.. . ,p}; otherwise, Vic chooses u {1, 2, ... , k}p uniformly
at random, and sends u and F to Peggy.
3. Peggy applies
T+1
to S together with Fjj, for each appropriate pair i,j
(this returns the registers of F
"
to their initial zero value). Peggy sends
S to Vic.




ster of R .If it now only contains zeros, then accept;
other-
Figure 2.11: Quantum Interactive Proof for Determining the Truth Value of a
QBF [Watrous, 7]
2.3.3 Quantum Interactive Proof for QBF
The quantum interactive proof for proving the truth value of a QBF is shown
in Figure 2.11. Note that m, fc, d, and T are as defined in Section 2.3.2 and in
the protocol in Figure 2.10. The capital, boldface letters represent registers,
which are collections of qubits upon which transformations are performed. This
protocol uses registers Rjj, Sjj, and Fjj, 1 < i < p and 1 < j < fc, where p is
some polynomial in m and fc = I )+n. Each Rj,j and Sjj is a collection
of n qubits, where
2n
is the size of the field T that the polynomials are taken to
be over [Watrous, 6]. The classical states of these registers are elements of T.
Each Fij is made up of d + 1 collections of n qubits, where d is the length
of the QBF, and the classical states of these registers are polynomials of degree
at most d and whose coefficents are in T [Watrous, 6]. Given u{l,2,...,fc}p,
R(u)
refers to the collection of registers Ri,i,Ri,2, ,Ri,u;_i and
F^'
refers
to Fj,i, Fii2, . . . , Fj,Ui for {1,2, ,p} [Watrous, 6]. Refer to Figure 2.12 for
an example of this.
C(R) is a matrix of polynomials such that for allz {1,2, . . . ,p}, C(R)iti,
C(R)i 2, , C(R)itN is the sequence of polynomials an honest prover returns, in
the protocol described in Section 2.3.2, given the random numbers Riti , i?,i2, . . . ,
Ri,k [Watrous, 7]. In other words, in step 1, Peggy prepares each row of the







Figure 2.12: Example division of R and F for JV = 10, m = 6, and u =
(9,3,4,7,2,5) [Watrous, 6].
in Figure 2.10. Then, in step 2, Vic checks that each row of polynomials forms
a valid proof of the truth value of the QBF. If any of the rows do not form
valid proofs, he rejects Peggy's proof. Vic needs to use the gate for reversible
computation to perform the check in step 2.
Ti:j is the unitary transformation defined by:
Tij : |R)|0) -+ \K)\C(R)ij) [Watrous, 7].
HK
is the Walsh-Hadamard transform, where
H : |0> -? 4=(|0) + |1 and H:\l)i- -J=(|0> - |1 [Watrous, 6].
v2 v2
Refer to [Watrous] for a proof of completeness and soundness of this protocol.
The error probability of the protocol is determined by p and n, and they are
assumed to have values so that the error is exponentially small [Watrous, 6].
Watrous uses this protocol to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.12 Every language in PSPACE has a 2-round quantum interactive
proof system with exponentially small error [Watrous, 2].
Quantum interactive proofs appear to be more powerful than classical inter
active proofs. All known classical interactive protocols for PSPACE problems
involve a non-constant number of rounds, and they cannot be parallelized, but
by Theorem 2.12 there exists a constant round quantum interactive protocol for
every PSPACE problem. Refer to [Babai] or [Goldwasser92] for the proof that
if the polynomial hierarchy (PH) is non-collapsing, then there does not exist





An interactive proof is perfect-zero knowledge if the only thing that is learned by
the verifier of the proof is the outcome of the proof. In terms of the discussion
of interactive proofs, this means that Vic learns nothing from Peggy that he
could not have learned by himself, except the fact that x is a yes or no-instance
of the decision problem. This means that Vic is completely convinced of what
Peggy is proving, but he could not prove the decision problem to anyone else so
that they would be convinced.
To prove that an interactive proof is perfect zero-knowledge, Vic needs to
be able to forge a transcript of the proof in a non-interactive way, since the
only way to show that Vic has learned nothing from Peggy is for him to re
produce the proof by himself. A transcript of an interactive proof is a listing
of all inputs to the proof and all messages sent or received by Vic during the
proof. If Vic can generate a forged transcript that resembles the real transcript,
without interacting with Peggy, then the proof is zero-knowledge for Vic. A
transcript resembles another transcript if the probability distributions of the
two transcripts are identical.
In this scheme to prove zero-knowledge, it is assumed that Vic will not devi
ate from the protocol. This is why the proof is only considered zero-knowledge
for Vic. What happens if he does cheat? Is the proof still zero-knowledge? To
prove that the proof is unconditionally zero-knowledge, Vic must be able to cre
ate an algorithm that, given any cheating scheme, will create a forged transcript
that resembles the real transcript for that cheating scheme.
3.1 Quadratic Residues
The proof presented in Figure 2.1 is not perfect zero-knowledge since Vic has
no way of creating a forging algorithm. He would need to generate the triples
(v,i,j), and given any two of these numbers and the fact that he is restricted
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Input: An integer n, with unknown factorization pq, where p and q are prime,
and x, a quadratic residue of n.
1. Repeat the following steps log2 n times:
(a) Peggy chooses v
Z*




Peggy sends y to Vic.
(b) Vic chooses i {0, 1} at random, and he sends i to Peggy.
(c) Peggy computes
z = ulv mod n,
where u
Z*
and is a solution to
u2 =
x mod n. Peggy sends z to
Vic.




2. Vic accepts Peggy's proof, that x is a quadratic residue of n, if step (d) is
verified in each of the log2 n rounds.
Figure 3.1: Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof for Quadratic Residues [Stinson, 396]
to polynomial time algorithms, he has no way of generating the third number
so that the triples will have the same probabilities as they did in the original
proof. An example of a perfect zero-knowledge proof is the protocol for quadratic
residues given in Figure 3.1.
3.1.1 Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof for Quadratic Residues
The following theorem proves that the protocol for quadratic residues given in
Figure 3.1 is an interactive proof by showing completeness and soundness.
Theorem 3.1 The protocol for quadratic residues is complete and sound.
Proof: To show that the proof is complete, show that if x is a quadr
atic residue then Vic will always accept Peggy's proof. Assume that
this is not true: x is a quadratic residue, and Vic rejects Peggy's
proof. This will only occur if
z2
^ xly mod n in at least one of the
log2 n rounds. Since x is a quadratic residue, there exists a u Z
*
which is a solution to
u2 = x mod n; therefore,
z = ulv mod
n,u2











Inpul,: An integer n with unknown factorization pq, where p and 17 are prime,
and x, a quadratic residue of n.
1. T = (n, x)
2. For j = 1 to log2 n




(c) Compute y_, =
z2(x')_1
mod n.
(d) Concatenate the triple (j/j,ij Zj) onto the end of T.
Figure 3.2: Forging Algorithm for Transcripts for Quadratic Residues
= xly mod n.
This is a contradiction, so our assumption is false; the protocol for
quadratic residues is complete.
To prove soundness, show that if x is a quadratic non-residue of n,
then there is only a small probability that Vic will accept Peggy's
proof. If x is a quadratic non-residue, then Peggy will not be able
to calculate u in step c, and the proof will only work if for all log2 n
rounds if Vic chooses i = 0 in every round, so that the exponent
on u is zero. The probability of this occurring, since i is chosen at
random from {0, 1}, is 2i0\2 or 1/n. This means that for large n
the proof is sound.
To show that the protocol for quadratic residues is a zero-knowledge proof,
there needs to be a valid forging algorithm. The forging algorithm is shown in
Figure 3.2. The output of the forging algorithm is a transcript T, consisting of
the input values n and x and triples (y,i, z) for each round. Theorem 3.2 proves
that the protocol for quadratic residues is a perfect zero-knowledge proof for Vic
by showing the validity of this forging algorithm; it shows that the probability of
a triple being generated by the forging algorithm is the same as the probability
of the triple being generated by the original proof.
Theorem 3.2 The protocol for quadratic residues is perfect zero-knowledge for
Vic.
Proof: To show that the protocol for quadratic residues is perfect
zero-knowledge, it needs to be verified that given the input to the
proof, the forging algorithm and the original proof create transcripts
with identical probability distributions. In the original proof, the
triple is uniquely determined by the selection of i and v. i is chosen
at random from {0, 1}; therefore, there are two choices for i, each
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with equal probability, v is chosen randomly from
Z*
which has
(p-l)(q-l) elements; therefore, there are (p - l){q - 1) choices for
v, again each with equal probability. The probability of any given
triple being calculated is
[2(p-l)(9-l)]
-1
In the forging algorithm, i is chosen at random from {0, 1}, and z is
chosen from
Z*
randomly. These two numbers exactly determine y;
therefore, the probability of any given triple being calculated by the
forging algorithm is the same as the probability of it being calculated
by the original proof. This means that the protocol for quadratic
residues in Figure 3.1 is perfect zero-knowledge for Vic.
To show that the proof is unconditionally zero-knowledge, it needs to be
shown that a forging algorithm can be created for any cheating version of Vic.
This can be done, but the details of that proof will not be shown here. Refer to
[Stinson, 393-395] for a description of this method.
3.1.2 Implementation of Protocol for Quadratic Residues
The algorithm in Figure 3.1 is implemented by the program quadres. quadres
is composed of two subprograms which implement Peggy and Vic. The programs
are run simultaneously, in separate windows, in order to simulate the interaction
between Peggy and Vic.
quadres is more restricted than the algorithm it implements since in princi
ple Peggy is not restricted to polynomial time, but in quadres she must work in
polynomial time. To help compensate for this shortcoming, the program allows
the user several options. One choice the user has is deciding which method
Peggy will use to choose what she is going to prove. The options are:




Method 2 Peggy randomly chooses n and x, and then finds u if it exists.
Method 3 Peggy reads in a random entry from a file of fifty entries, where an
entry consists of the three numbers n, x, and u.
Method 1 is easily the fastest method, but it will always result in x's that
are quadratic residues of n. The input chosen by Methods 2 and 3 do not
require that x be a quadratic residue of n, but, for Method 2 and possibly for
Method 3, depending on how the file is generated, the purpose of the proof is
being undermined. The proof that the algorithm in Figure 3.1 is perfect
zero-
knowledge relies on the assumption that finding the square root of a number
modulo n is hard. That calculation is what Peggymust do inMethod 2. Because
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Peggy must do a non-polynomial time calculation, the number of digits in n is
severely restricted.
Vic's other choices will only effect Peggy's choice of n. Vic can choose
whether or not n is required to be the product of two primes. The idea behind
adding this choice was that the calculation might be faster if it was only nec
essary to find one large random number rather than finding two large random
primes, but this has not turned out to be true. Since there is no major dif
ference in time, it is better to choose n to be the product of two primes, since
the protocol is not secure if n is made up of small factors. Vic can also choose
if n should always have the maximum number of digits, or if n should have a
random number of digits. The maximum number of digits is set to two hundred.
The output of quadres is both a transcript written to the screen and a
transcript written to a file. The transcript written to the screen consists of a
detailed description of the inputs to the program, the messages between Peggy
and Vic, and the decision made by the program. The transcript is in two parts
corresponding to what Peggy knows and to what Vic knows. This helps the user
visualize what information is private to either Peggy or Vic. The transcript that
is written to a file is appended to the file quadres . trans, and it consists of only
n and x, y, i, and z from each round, and either the word SUCCESS or FAILURE,
depending on the outcome of the program. The transcript is saved this way so
that it is comparable to the transcript of the forging algorithm.
The forging algorithm in Figure 3.2 is implemented by the program qrforge.
The inputs to the program are simply n and x, and the output from the program
is a file qrforge. trans, which has the same format as quadres. trans. Since
the inverse of x is needed in the forging algorithm, n and x must be relatively
prime. If n is the product of two large primes, it is very unlikely for n and x to
have common factors, since x would have to be one of the two prime factors of
n. If n is small, or if n is not the product of two primes, it is more likely that
n and x will have a common factor. This is another reason for choosing n to be
the product of two primes, and for using Method 1.
Several test runs of quadres and qrforge can be found in Appendix B.2. n
should have at least a few hundred digits so that the protocol will be secure.
3.2 Subgroup Membership
The protocol for subgroup non-membership is similar to the protocol for quadratic
non-residues; it is not perfect zero-knowledge since no forging algorithm is
known. Figure 3.3 presents a protocol for subgroup membership.
3.2.1 Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof for Subgroup Mem
bership
The proof shown in Figure 3.3 is perfect zero-knowledge for Vic as shown by
Theorem 3.3, which refers to the forging algorithm presented in Figure 3.4.
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Input: A positive integer n and two distinct elements a, 6 Z'n, where the
order of a is denoted by m and is publicly known.
1. Repeat the following steps log2 n times:




and sends g to Vic.
(b) Vic chooses i {0, 1} at random. He sends i to Peggy.
(c) Peggy computes
h = j + ik mod m,
where fc {0, 1, . . . , m 1}, such that b =
ak
mod n. She sends h to
Vic.
(d) Vic checks that
ah = blg mod n.
2. Vic accepts Peggy's proof, that 6 is a member of the subgroup of
Z*
generated by a, if step d is verified in each of the log2 n rounds.
Figure 3.3: Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof for Subgroup Membership [Stinson,
398]
Theorem 3.3 The protocol for subgroup membership is perfect zero-knowledge
for Vic.
Proof: To show that the protocol for subgroup membership is per
fect zero-knowledge, it needs to be verified that the proof is an in
teractive proof, in other words, that it is complete and sound, and
that there exists a valid forging algorithm.
To prove that the protocol for subgroup membership is complete,
show that if 6 is a member of the subgroup of
Z*
generated by a,
then Vic always accepts Peggy's proof. Vic will accept Peggy's proof
if for all log2 n rounds,
ah = blg mod n. Since 6 is a member of the












= (ak)xai mod n
= blg mod n.
This shows that the proof is complete.
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Input : A positive integer n and two distinct elements a, 6
Z*
where the
order of a is denoted by m and is publicly known.
1. T = (n, a, 6,m)
2. For fc = 1 to log2 n
(a) Choose hk {0, 1, . . . , m - 1} at random.
(b) Choose ik {0, 1} at random.
(c) Compute gk =
a^ib^)-1
mod n.
(d) Concatenate the triple (gk,h,hk) onto the end of T.
Figure 3.4: Forging Algorithm for Transcripts for Subgroup Membership
The protocol for subgroup membership is sound if 6 is not a member
of the subgroup generated by a, then there is only a small probability
that Vic will accept Peggy's proof. Vic accepts Peggy's proof if for
all log2 n rounds,
ah = b*g mod n. Since g =
aJ mod n, this is only
true if 6 =
a*
mod n, for some fc {0, 1, . . . ,m 1}, or if i = 0. The
first case is a contradiction, since it was assumed that there does not
exist such a fc; therefore, the only way Vic will accept Peggy's proof
is if i = 0 in all rounds. The probability of this occurring, since i is
chosen at random from {0, 1}, is ji^r or 1/n. This means that for
large n the proof is sound.
To complete the proof, it needs to be shown that the forging algo
rithm given in Figure 3.4 is valid. The output of both the original
proof and the forging algorithm is a transcript T, which consists of
the inputs, n, a, 6, and m, and a triple, (g,i,h), for each of the
log2 n rounds. In the original proof, each triple is uniquely deter
mined by the choices of j and i. There are m choices for j, each with
equal probability, since j is chosen at random from {0, 1, . . . , m
- 1}.
There are two choices for i, also each with equal probability, since i
is chosen at random from 0, 1. This gives a probability of l/(2m)
for the calculation of any given triple. The forging algorithm ex
actly determines the triple by selecting h and i. The selections of
these two variables are analogous to the selection of j and i in the
original proof; therefore, the probability of calculating a given triple
is the same for both the forging algorithm and the original proof.
This completes the proof. The protocol for subgroup membership is
perfect zero-knowledge for Vic.
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3.2.2 Implementation of Protocol for Subgroup Member
ship
The program subgrp implements the perfect zero-knowledge protocol for sub
group membership, given in Figure 3.3. subgrp has the same format as quadres;
it is split into two subprograms, one representing Peggy and one representing
Vic.
As in quadres, there are several methods Peggy can use to choose what she
is going to prove:
Method 1 Vic inputs the values of n, a, and m such that
am
= 1 mod n.
Peggy then chooses fc at random and calculates 6 such that
b = a mod n.
Method 2 Peggy chooses n, a, and 6 at random, such that a and 6 are relatively
prime to n. She then calculates fc and finds m, if it exists.
Method 3 Peggy reads a random entry from a fifty-entry file, where an entry
consists of the five numbers n, a, m, fc, and 6.
These methods are similar to the methods for quadres, so therefore, they have
similar properties. Method 1 is always going to give 6's that are members of
the subgroup of Zn generated by a, whereas Methods 2 and 3 will give 6's that
sometimes are and sometimes are not members of the subgroup. Method 1 can
perform with large numbers of digits, but Method 2 is very slow even for small
numbers of digits. Vic also has the same choices about n as he did for quadres.
Note that there is no efficient way to generate examples of subgroup members
for large n's, since when using Method 1, Vic is required to provide n, a, and
m. Method 1 was implemented this way because there is no efficient algorithm
for computing the order of a mod n.
The output of subgrp is both the transcript printed to the screen and one
printed to a file. The transcript printed to the file is appended to subgrp . trans
and contains n, a, m, and 6, g, i, and h from each round, and either SUCCESS
or FAILURE depending on the outcome of the proof. The forging algorithm
in Figure 3.4 is implemented by the program sgforge. The inputs to this
program are n, a, m, and 6, and the transcript from this program is saved to
sgforge. trans, m is required to be the order of a modulo n, and 6 and n are
required to be relatively prime. Several test runs of subgrp and sgforge can be
found in Appendix B.3. Note that n should have at least a few hundred digits




Several references contain overviews of the history of interactive and zero-
knowledge protocols. Johnson gives an extremely detailed overview of the early
history in his NP-completeness column [Johnson]. This paper includes several
ideas for applications of these protocols. Some cryptography textbooks, includ
ing [Stinson, Ch. 13] and [Menezes, 405-417,421-424], have a thorough descrip
tion of the various definitions of zero-knowledge and interactive protocols. For
an entertaining presentation, refer to [Quisquater], which uses a discussion of
the secrets of Ali Baba's cave to give a simple illustration of zero-knowledge
protocols.
The notion of an interactive proof system was independently developed by
Goldwasser et al. [Goldwasser85] and by Babai [Babai]. The two definitions
are slightly different, but they were proved to be equivalent by Goldwasser and
Sipser [Goldwasser92]. The version discussed in this thesis is the version that
was introduced in [Goldwasser85].
Babai calls his version of an interactive proof systems an "Arthur-Merlin
game". In this definition, Peggy goes by the name Merlin, and Vic goes by
the name Arthur. Merlin's job in the protocol is exactly the same as Peggy's,
but Arthur is more restricted than Vic. His messages may only consist of se
quences of random bits obtained from his private source, where the length of
the sequences is determined only by the input to the protocol. Because of this
restriction Arthur has nothing to do until Merlin sends his final message, then
Arthur has polynomial time to accept or reject Merlin's proof based on the
input and the transcript [Johnson, 430]. [Goldwasser89] is a final version of
[Goldwasser85] which includes a description of Arthur-Merlin games.
Shamir's proof that IP = PSPACE [Shamir] is an extension of a result found
by Lund et al. [Lund]. They proved that IP contains the polynomial hierarchy,
PH. Prior to this, Golgreich et al. had shown that IP contained some languages
which were not believed to be in NP [Goldreich]. In particular, they present an
IP for graph non-isomorphism. It was also shown in [Goldreich] that under the
assumption of the existence of secure encryption functions, all languages in NP
have zero-knowledge proofs.
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Several generalizations of zero-knowledge proofs have been created, includ
ing computational zero-knowledge proofs and zero-knowledge arguments. For
perfect zero-knowledge the forging algorithmmust create transcripts which have
the same probability distributions as transcripts created by the original proof.
This condition can be relaxed to create computational zero-knowledge proofs.
All that is required for computational zero-knowledge is for the two transcripts
to be indistinguishable in polynomial time, rather than having the same prob
abilistic distributions. Bit commitment schemes are often used to create these
proofs.
The following is a description of how a bit commitment scheme works. Peggy
chooses a message and places it in a safe. Only she holds the key to the safe.
Peggy is committed to the message since she can not change what is in the safe.
Vic can not know what is in the safe unless Peggy opens the safe for him, or
she gives him the key to the safe. The message that Peggy places in the safe is
a bit. The bit commitment scheme is a function f : {0,1} x X -> y, where X
and y are finite sets. Peggy chooses x X and encrypts her message, the bit
she wishes to conceal, into a blob using /. The blob is an element of y.
A valid bit commitment scheme must be concealing and binding. The scheme
is concealing if Vic can not determine from the blob what the original bit was,
and the scheme is binding if Peggy can not unlock the blob as both a zero and
a one. In a computational zero-knowledge proof, the concealing condition can
depend upon a computational assumption and the binding condition must be
unconditional. Zero-knowledge arguments use bit-commitment schemes which
have a computational assumption for the binging condition and have an uncondi
tional concealing condition. Computational zero-knowledge proofs can be trans
formed into zero-knowledge arguments by changing the bit commitment scheme
that is used in the protocol. The concepts of computational zero-knowledge
proofs,
zero-knowledge arguments, and bit-commitment schemes are discussed
in [Stinson, 398-407]. For a more detailed discussion refer to [Brassard88]. The
term zero-knowledge argument was first introduced in [Brassard90], which also
contains a user-friendly discussion of the various definitions of zero-knowledge.
One clear application of interactive and zero-knowledge protocols is that any
problem in NP can be proven by a zero-knowledge protocol, and this implies
that any mathematical proof can be converted to a zero-knowledge protocol
[Schneier, 108]. This can be used to taunt your colleagues, since you can prove
to them that you know of the existence of a proof to a certain problem without
revealing the details of that proof. A more useful application is the notion of
a proof of identity. A proof of identity allows Vic to verify Peggy's identity
without Peggy having to reveal any information, such as a password. A simple
example of this type of protocol is given in [Salomaa], and more information
can be found in [Simmons] and [Feige]. Proofs of identity can be used in the
development of smart cards. Refer to [Simmons, 599-603] or [Seberry, 296-298]
for a detailed description of this application. Zero-knowledge concepts can also
be used for playing cards over a network. There are several papers which discuss
poker protocols, but, in particular, Crepeau has focused on a zero-knowledge




All programs were written in C++, qbf uses two classes, Polynomial and
Formula. Both of these classes implement all the operations needed in qbf, as
well as doing their own input and output. The programs quadres, qrforge,
subgrp, and sgforge share an include file zero-knowledge . h, which includes
the necessary files, declares the common functions, and has the necessary macro
definitions.
The Multiple Precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C Library
(MIRACL) was used to implement multi-precision arithmetic. Norman Moul-
ton's modifications to the library, as described in [Moulton], were used so that
the library worked on the R.I.T. Sun workstations. The MIRACL package in
cludes a C++ class Big which implements multi-precision integers. Big's can be
used just as integers since all of the operators have been overloaded. The same
principle was used in developing the classes Polynomial and Formula. The
MIRACL library is available on the internet at [MIRACL]. It is a shareware
package that is free for academic use.
To use the MIRACL package, the library miracl . a must first be compiled.
Before this is done, the file mirdef . h needs to be modified for the specific
hardware that you are using. This process is described in the manual provided
with MIRACL. The package includes both rational and integer arithmetic, but if
the rational arithmetic package is not needed, then the library can be compiled
without it. Note that MIRCAL uses probabilistic primes rather than pure-math
primes. The following is the copy of mirdef .h that I used to compile MIRACL
on the R.I.T. Sun workstations:
#define MIRACL 32
#def ine mr_utype int
#def ine mr_unsign32 unsigned int





Once the library has been compiled, simply copy the filesmiracl . a,miracl . h,
mirdef . h, big . h, and big . cpp to the directory where your code is located, and
compile your code with the library miracl . a. See the sample program below
for an example of how to use MIRACL:
//
// Name: sample. cpp
// Author: Molli Noland
// Date: May 2, 1999
// Description: A sample program for demonstrating how to use
// the MIRACL





Miracl precision( 300, 10 ) ; // 300 decimal digits
main ( ) {
Big x, y, n, p;
cout "Enter a LARGE number x: ";
cin x;
cout "Enter a LARGE number y: ";
cin y;
cout "Enter a LARGE number n: ";
cin >> n;
cout "\n\nx + y
=
"
x + y endl;
cout "x * y
=
"
x * y endl;
if ( x > y ) cout "x mod y
=
"
x '/. y endl;
else cout "y mod x
=
"
y 7. x endl;





= nextprime( n );




Running sample, the following output is
obtained:
Enter a LARGE number x: 21786348649365864898621756346214278484
7693
Enter a LARGE number y: 72587537257835275782158276984947957047












The first prime after n is: 565267547548357817587575754753847
It should be noted that there is an error in the code of subgrp and sgforge,
that occurs only when n is an odd multiple of five. The error actually occurs in
a library function, and the error message says, in reference to n, "Illegal Mont
gomery Modulus (must be odd)". The documentation for the library referred
to [Montgomery], but since the value of n is odd when this error is occurring,
no solution, other than not allowing n to be an odd multiple of five, was found
for this problem. This problem actually does not come up at all if n is chosen
to be a multiple of two primes and n has more than three digits.
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Appendix B
Test Runs of Programs
The following sections include the sample input and output of the programs:
qbf, quadres, qrforge, subgrp, and sgforge.
B.l Quantified Boolean Formulas (qbf)
The program qbf implements the protocol for determining the truth value of
a QBF in Figure 2.3. qbf uses the classes Polynomial and Formula to imple
ment the protocol. Polynomial implements polynomials of a single variable,
and objects of this type are used to represent the polynomials q(zi). Formula
implements QBF's and all the operations performed on them in the protocol.
The first sample input to qbf is the QBF
Q = Vxi3x2(xi AxY).
This is the sample that was worked through in Section 2.2.2. The input file for
Qis:
A xl E x2 ( xl & ! x2 )
It is important to note that there can be no extra whitespace at the end of the
input file. When qbf was run on Q, the following output was obtained:
Peggy needs a seed before she can choose random numbers .
Number: 124
Input :




a (mod p) : 0
Al:
A2: Axl Ex2 ( xl & !x2 )
A = A2
Vic:
I need more information! !
Peggy:
Vic:
A': Ex2 ( xl & !x2 )
q(xl): xl
A = A'(xl = 6): Ex2 ( 6 & !x2 )
a: 6
Peggy:
a (mod p) : 6
Al:
A2: Ex2 ( 6 & !x2 )
A = A2
Vic:




A': 6 & !x2
q(x2): -6x2 + 6
A = A'(x2 = 1): 6 & 0
a: 0
a (mod p) : 0





The value of Axl Ex2 ( xl k !x2 ) IS 0 mod 17
Since Vic accepts Peggy's proof, the QBF Q is false, which was shown in Sec
tion 2.2.2.
Now that we have seen a sample where Vic accepts, we will turn to a case
where he rejects Peggy's proof. The following is the output from the QBF:
R = Vxi3x2(xi V X2)
Peggy needs a seed before she can choose random numbers .
Number: 1884
Input :






a (mod p) : 0
Al:
A2: Axl Ex2 ( xl I !x2 )
A = A2
I need more information! !
A': Ex2 ( xl I !x2 )
q(xl): 2x1 + 1
Vic:




Since Vic rejected Peggy's proof, the QBF R is true.
These examples were simple. To see a more complex example, we will use
the test described in Section 2.2.4. The QBF is
B = 3xiVx23x3Vx43x5((xTVxiVx3)A(x2Vxi'VxI)A(xiVx4Vx5)A(x3Vx7Vx7)),
but since the input to qbf must be a simple QBF, B needed to be rewritten so
that it was simple; therefore, the input file for B is:
E xl A x2 E xlprime ( ( ( xlprime & xl ) I ( ! xlprime & ! xl )
) & ( E x3 A x4 E x5 ( ( ( ( ! xlprime I ! x2 ) I x3 ) & ( ( x2
I ! x3 ) I ! x4 ) ) & ( ( ( xlprime I x4 ) I x5 ) & ( ( x3 I !
x4 ) I ! x5 ) ) ) ) )
The following is the output from qbf when run on B:
Peggy needs a seed before she can choose random numbers.
Number: 790
Input :
A: Exl Ax2 Exlprime ( ( ( xlprime & xl ) I ( ! xlprime &
!xl ) ) & ( Ex3 Ax4 Ex5 ( ( ( ( ixlprime I !x2 ) I x3 ) & ( ( x2
I !x3 ) I !x4 ) ) & ( ( ( xlprime I x4 ) I x5 ) & ( ( x3 I !x4 )




a (mod p) : 0
Al:
A2: Exl Ax2 Exlprime ( ( ( xlprime & xl ) I ( ixlprime k
!xl ) ) k ( Ex3 Ax4 Ex5 ( ( ( ( !xlprime | !x2 ) I x3 ) & ( ( x2
I !x3 ) I !x4 ) ) k ( ( ( xlprime I x4 ) I x5 ) k ( ( x3 I !x4 )




I need more information! !
A': Ax2 Exlprime ( ( ( xlprime k xl ) I ( ixlprime & !xl
) ) k ( Ex3 Ax4 Ex5 ( ( ( ( Ixlprime I !x2 ) I x3 ) k ( ( x2 | !
x3 ) I !x4 ) ) k ( ( ( xlprime I x4 ) I x5 ) k ( ( x3 I !x4 ) |
43
!x5 ) ) ) ) )
q(xl) : 224x1*2 + 784x1 + 560
Vic:
The value of Exl Ax2 Exlprime ( ( ( xlprime k xl ) I (
ixlprime & !xl ) ) k ( Ex3 Ax4 Ex5 ( ( ( ( Ixlprime I !x2 ) I x3
) & ( ( x2 I !x3 ) | !x4 ) ) k ( ( ( xlprime I x4 ) I x5 ) & ( (
x3 I !x4 ) | !x5 ) ) ) ) ) IS NOT 0 mod 58858816980462740920873
6429934879882143740957133192487347773915293855095697820045493343
5387283609321
Since Vic rejected Peggy's proof, the QBF B is true. Recall that the consequence
of this QBF being true is that the graph in Figure 2.8 can be pebbled by
eighteen pebbles. As mentioned before, instances of QBF's which may lead to
applications should have at least 100 variables and 400 clauses.
B.2 Quadratic Residues
The program quadres implements the zero-knowledge protocol for quadratic
residues in Figure 3.1, and the program qrforge implements the corresponding
forging algorithm in Figure 3.2.
B.2.1 quadres
The program quadres is a simple shell script which runs the programs quadres.
peggy and quadres_vic in separate windows. quadres_peggy and quadres_vic
represent Peggy and and Vic's separate parts of the protocol. The two programs
communicate throughout the protocol by reading and writing to a set of shared
files.
To demonstrate how the program quadres works, we will look at a simple
example. Even though on the screen Vic's window would be on the left and
Peggy's window would be on the right, here Vic's output is listed first, and then
Peggy's output, quadres.vic will prompt the user for information, including a
seed to start the random number generation and answers to a series of questions.
Vic's output is as follows:
Peggy needs a seed before she can decide what she will prove.
Number : 7
Which decision method is to be used? (1, 2, or 3) : 1
Should n be the product of two primes? (y/n) : y










Peggy sent y = 400
I set i = 1









Peggy sent y = 562























1339 IS a quadratic residue modulo 1411
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Peggy's output would appear in her window at the same time as Vic's. The
output would alternate from window to window as the messages are passed
between Peggy and Vic. Peggy's output is as follows:
I will prove that 1339




Vic chose i = 1






Vic chose i = 1






Vic chose i = 1
I set z = 1228
Vic's check SUCCEEDED!!
End Round 11















The proceeding was an example of Vic accepting Peggy's proof that x is a
quadratic residue of n. If Vic rejects Peggy's proof, we get the following output
from Vic:
Peggy needs a seed before she can decide what she will prove.
Number: 357
Which decision method is to be used? (1, 2, or 3) : 2
Should n be the product of two primes? (y/n) : y
Should n always contain the maximum number of digits? (y/n) : n
Peggy sent n = 3683
x = 1592














1592 IS NOT a quadratic residue modulo 3683
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The protocol continued for four rounds because Vic chose i to be zero in the
first three rounds, but in the fourth round he chose i to be one. The only
change in Peggy's output is that when one of the rounds fails, she prints
Vic's check FAILED! ! instead ofVic's check SUCCEEDED !!. The only change
in the transcript is that it ends with the word FAILURE rather than SUCCESS.
Note that the second input method was used to generate this example since the
first input method always generates successful proofs.
The last sample that will be provided is more complex, n has two hundred
digits rather than four digits. This size n would be appropriate for instances
which may lead to applications. The last two rounds of Vic's output are pre
sented here:
Begin Round 661
Peggy sent y = 299329353561027973058003219925609289910461456140
377526149689
I set i = 0














































This example was generated using the first input method, and n is the product





Vic chose i = 0








Vic chose i = 0






The program qrforge implements the forging algorithm presented in Figure 3.2.
The purpose of the forging algorithm is for Vic to be able to generate a transcript
of the proof, that is identical to the real transcript, without any interaction with
Peggy-
To demonstrate how qrforge works, here is a simple example. The following
is the output that appears to the screen. The values of n and x are entered by
the user. Note that these are the values of n and x that were used in the first
example in Section B.2.1.
The inputs to this program are two integers n and x,
such that x is a quadratic residue mod n.
n: 1411
x: 1339
Need a seed before the transcript can be generated.
Number: 786













The programs subgrp and sgforge are very
similar to quadres and qrforge
in the way that they are implemented and
in the way that they are run.
B.3.1 subgrpjtJ. . D
The program subgrp implements the
zero-knowledge protocol for subgroup
membership in Figure 3.3.
Like quadres, subgrp is a simple shell script which
runs two programs subgrp4>eggy and
subgrp.vic.
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Again, to illustrate how these programs work, a couple samples will be given.
The first example is a simple example where Vic accepts Peggy's proof that & is a
member of the subgroup of
Z*
generated by a. The following is the output from
Vic. Again the user must provide information when prompted by subgrp_vic.
Peggy needs a seed before she can decide what she will prove.
Number : 145
Which decision method is to be used? (1, 2, or 3) : 2
Should n be the product of two primes? (y/n) : y
Should n always contain the maximum number of digits? (y/n) : n









I set i = 0























I set i = 0







9 IS a member of the subgroup generated by 47
Peggy's output is as follows:
I will prove that 9
is a member of the subgroup of
Zn* generated by 47




Vic chose i = 0






Vic chose i = 1







Vic chose i = 0
I set h = 18
Vic's check SUCCEEDED!!
End Round 7
The transcript from this protocol is saved in the file subgrp. trans. The tran















When using the first input method
for quadres, the user is not required to.
enter any of the numbers, the
program generates both n and x. The first input
method for subgrp requires that the user
enter n, a, and a number m such
that
am
= 1 mod n. It is recommended that n contain at least a few hundred
digits in any instance that may
lead to an application, and for large n it may
be difficult to find m. The following sample discusses one method of generating
examples with large n's
The next sample uses the first input method, so n, a, and m
needed to be
generated. This was done by constructing n to be the product of primes, p and
q, and then randomly selecting
a's until one was found such that
a 2 =1 mod n.
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Since there is a high probability of this being true, it was not hard to find such
an a. The last two rounds of Vic's output for this sample are as follows:
Begin Round 663




I set i = 0













































38884378281 IS a member of the subgroup generated by 3484759052
927768818706895056053199717157684000970105451873189686944441635
890731700185740403989276101







Vic chose i = 0









Vic chose i = 0





The program sgforge is an implementation of the forging algorithm presented
in Figure 3.4. The following is a sample of how the program sgforge works.
The user must enter the values of n, a, b, and m. For this sample, the values
from the first sample in Section B.3.1 were entered. The portion of the output
that is printed to the screen is as follows:
The inputs to this program axe four integers n, a, b, and m,





Need a seed before the transcript can be generated.
Number : 18
The transcript that is generated is stored in the file sgforge. trans. The

















C.l Polynomial and Formula Header Files
The following are the header files for the classes Polynomial and Formula.
These classes are used by the program qbf.
//
// Name: poly.h
// Author: Molli Noland
// Date: May 2, 1999














public: // constructors and destructors
//
// Name: Constructor





// Name: Copy Constructor
// Description: Copies the value of the argument to this polynomial.
// Arguments: The polynomial to copy.
//
Polynomial ( const Polynomial fcpoly ) ;
//
// Name: Destructor






// Description: Gets the value of the polynomial when var.valueis
// substituted for the variable.
// Arguments: The value to substitute.
// Returns: The value of the polynomial evaluated at var.value.
//




// Description: Sets the name of the variable to var.
// Arguments: The name of the variable.
//
void set_variable( RUCString var );
//
// Name: add
// Description: Adds a single term to the polynomial. If there is
// not a like term, and the polynomial is already of
// maximum length, nothing is added.
// Arguments: The coefficent and the power describing the term.
//
void add( Big coeff, Big power );
public: // operators
//
// Name: Assignment Operator
// Description: Assigns the value of the argument to this polynomial.
// Arguments: The polynomial to copy.
// Returns: A copy of this polynomial.
//
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const Polynomial &operator=( const Polynomial ftpoly );
//
// Name : Addition Operator
// Description: Adds poly to this polynomial and returns the sum.
// Arguments: The polynomial to add to this.
// Returns: The sum polynomial.
//
Polynomial operator+( const Polynomial fcpoly );
//
// Name: Multiplication Operator
// Description: Multiplies this polynomial by poly and returns the
// product .
// Arguments: The polynomial to multiply by this.
// Returns : The product polynomial .
//
Polynomial operator* ( const Polynomial fcpoly ) ;
public: // output
//
// Name: Output Operator
// Description: Outputs the polynomial to the output stream.
// Written in terms of the variable.
// Arguments: The output stream and the polynomial to output.
// Returns: The output stream.
//
friend ostream &operator( ostream &os,
const Polynomial ftpoly ) ;
private: // helper functions
//
// Name: copy
// Description: Called by the copy constructor and the assignment
// operator to copy the value of the argument to this
// polynomial.
// Arguments: The polynomial to copy.
//
void copy( const Polynomial ftpoly ) ;
private: // data members
Big the.poly [MAX.POLY.LENGTH] ; // The
coefficents and powers.
int length; // The length of the.poly.





// Name: formula. h
// Author: Molli Noland
// Date: May 2, 1999












public: // constructors and destructors
//
// Name: Constructor




// Name: Copy Constructor
// Description: Copies the argument to this formula.
//
FormulaC const Formula ftformula ) ;
//
// Name: Destructor






// Description: Returns the value of the formula.






// Description: Returns the length of the formula.
// Returns: The length as an integer.
//
int get.length () ;
//
// Name: poly.description
// Description: Returns the polynomial description of the formula.
// Only recalculated if the formula has changed since
// the last time it was called.
















int get_prime_version( Formula fca.prime, RWCString invariable );
get.prime.version
Calculates the prime version of this formula. The
prime version is found by removing the first
quantifier.
The prime version is saved in a.prime, the variable
quantified by the removed quantifier is saved in
variable. These are not set if there is no
quantifier to remove.
1 if the removed quantifier was universal,
0 if the removed quantifier was existential,
or -1 if there was no quantifier to remove.
//
// Name: split.formula
// Description: Splits the formula at the first quantifier.
// Arguments : Everything before the last fc or I before the first
// quantifier is saved in al, and everything after the
// fc or I is saved in a2.
// Returns : 1 if the last operation before the first quantifier
// was 4,
// 0 if the operation was I , or
// -1 if there was no operation before the first
// quantifier.
//
int split_formula( Formula fcal, Formula fca2 );
//
// Name: removed.parens
// Description: Indicates whether or not outside parens have been
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// removed.
// Returns : Returns true if the outside parens were removed by
// the last call to remove.outside.parens (and the







// Description: Removes the parens from the outside of the formula if
// they exist , and sets removed.parens to the
// appropriate value.
//
void remove.outside.parens 0 ;
//
// Name: remove.quantifier
// Description: Removes the first quantifier and replaces every
// occurrence of the variable that was quantified by the
// first quantifier with var.value. It also replaces
// the negated occurrences of the variable with one
// minus var.value.
// Arguments: The value to replace the variable with, assumed to be
// zero or one.
//
void remove_quantifier( char var.value );
//
// Name: append
// Description: Appends the given string on the end of the formula if
// the formula is not already of maximum length.
// Arguments: The string to append to the formula.
//
void append ( RWCString string ) ;
//
// Name: evaluate
// Description: Replaces each occurrence of variable with var.value,
// and each occurrence of the negated variable with one
// minus var.value.
// Arguments: The variable to replace, and the value to replace it
// with.
//
void evaluate ( RWCString variable, Big var.value );
public : // operators
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//
// Name: Assignment Operator
// Description: Assigns the value of the argument to this formula.
// Arguments: The formula to copy.
// Returns: A reference to this formula.
//
const Formula ftoperator=( const Formula fcformula );
public: // input and output
//
// Name: Output Operator
// Description: Outputs the formula to the output stream.
// Arguments : The oput stream and the formula to output .
// Returns: The output stream.
//
friend ostream &operator( ostream fcos,
const Formula fcformula ) ;
//
// Name: Input Operator.
// Description: Reads in the formula from the input stream.
// The formula is assumed to have valid syntax.
// Arguments: The input stream and a reference to the
// formula object to read in.
// Returns: The input stream.
//
friend istream fcoperator( istream fcis, Formula fcformula );
private: // helper functions
//
// Name: copy
// Description: Called by the copy constructor and the assignment
// operator to copy the argument to this formula.
// Arguments: The formula to copy.
//
void copy( const Formula fcformula );
//
// Name: create.poly
// Description: A recursive function called by poly.descriptionwhich
// creates the polynomial associated with this formula.
// Arguments: The variable the polynomial is assumed to be in.
// Returns: The polynomial.
//
Polynomial create.poly ( RWCString var ) ;
private: // data members
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RWCString the_formula[MAX_FORMULA_LENGTH] ; // Formula as strings.
int length; // Number of strings in the.formula.
Big value; // Value of the formula.
Polynomial poly; // The associated polynomial.
int evaluated; // True if value calculated.
int poly.created; // True if polynomial created.





















The program qbf implements the protocol for determining the truth value of a




Implementation of Shamir's Interactive Proof of
Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBF) .
The name of a file that contatins a QBF (this is
required) , a prime (this is optional unless the value is
provided) , and the proposed value of the QBF (this is
optional) .
The user will be asked for a seed to begin the random
number generation.
The input to the protocol and the output at each round
of the protocol. The style reflects the style of the
algorithm presented in this thesis .
?include
"qbf.h"
int main( int argc, char *argv[] M
Miracl precision(500,10) ;
Big p, a, r, orig.a, al.inv;
Formula A, Al, A2, orig.A, A.prime;
Polynomial q;




// Check for the correct number of arguments. If not correct,
// print usage information and quit.
if( ( argc < 2 ) II ( argc > 4 ) H
cout "Usage: qbf <filename> <prime> <value> where\n";
cout
"


















// Peggy needs to get a seed from Vic for choosing
random numbers .






irand( seed ) ;
// Read in the QBF.
input. open ( argv[l] , ios::in );
input A;
input. close () ;
// Choose the prime if one is not provided.
if( argc < 3 )
p
=
nextprime( rand( MAX.DIGITS, 10 ) ) ;
else p
= atoi ( argv [2] ) ;
// Set proposed value of A to 0, if a value is not provided.
if ( argc < 4 ) a = 0;
else a = atoi ( argv [3] ) ;
// Store the initial versions of A and a.
orig.A - A;
orig.a = a;





















while ( Idone ){
//
// Step A: Peggy sends a (mod p) to Vic. She splits A into











a (mod p) :
" ( a '/. p ) ;
// Split formula and print Al and A2.
operation







// Print out what A equals in terms of Al and
A2.
66









A = Al + A2" endl;
break;
default :
if( Al.get.length () == 0 ) cout " A = A2" endl;
else cout
"




// Step B: If A2 is empty, Vic checks if he is done.
// Else if Al is not empty Vic sets A
= A2 and
// computes the new value of a.









// If A2 is empty, Vic accepts if and oly if a
= al mod p.
if ( A2.get_length() == 0 H
done = 1;
if ( ( a '/. p )
== ( A1.get.value () 7, p ) ) accepts = 1;
else accepts = 0;
}
// If Al is not empty, set A to A2 and correct value of a.
else if( Al.get.lengthO != 0 ){
A A2;
// If the operation was multiplication and al = 0,
// then Vic accepts if and only if a
- 0 mod p.
if( ( operation == 1 ) fcfc ( Al.get.valueO == 0 ) ){
done = 1;
if ( ( a '/, p )
== 0 ) accepts - 1;
else accepts = 0;
}
// If the operation is multiplication, then a = a / al mod p.
else if( operation == 1 ){
al.inv = inverse ( Al.get.valueO, p );
a = ( a * al.inv ) '/. p;
}




else if( operation == 0 ) a = ( a Al.get.valueO ) 7. p;








a (mod p) :
"
( a 7, p ) ;
}




I need more information!!" endl;
//











// Peggy computes the polynomial description of
A'
,
// and prints out A' and its polynomial description.
q
= A.poly.descriptionO ;












// Step 2: Vic checks the value of a. He then sends a random r,









// If the removed quantifier was universal, Vic checks
// that q(0) * q(l) = a mod p. If not he rejects.
if ( ( operation == 1 ) ftfc
( ( ( q.get_value( 0 ) * q.get_value( 1 ) ) 7. p )




// If the removed quantifier was existential, Vic checks
// that q(0) + q(l) = a mod p. If not he rejects.
else if ( ( operation == 0 ) ftfc
( ( ( q.get_value( 0 ) + q.get_value( 1 ) ) 7. p )





// If Vic has not rejected he chooses a random r and sets
// A equal to A' evaluated at r, and sets a = q(r) mod p.
else{
r = rand(((brand() 7. (MAX.DIGITS / 2)) + 1), 10) 7. p;
A.prime . evaluate ( variable , r ) ;
A = A.prime;
a = q.get_value( r ) 7. p;





































The file zero.knowledge . h is included by several programs. It contains the
declarations for the functions which implement the various input methods for













Include file for all zero-knowledge programs. Includes




























Chooses n and u at random. Calculates x = u~2 mod n.
Because of the way that the calculation is done, x will
always be a quadratic residue of n. n is restricted to
MAX.DIGITS digits.
References to n, x, and u, and optional integers
prime.product and always.max. If prime.product is
TRUE, n will be the product of two primes. The default
value is FALSE. If always.max is TRUE, n will always be
the maximum number of digits. The default value if FALSE.
The values of n, x, and u, such that x
= u~2 mod n.
,one( Big fcn, Big ftx, Big fcu,







Chooses n and x at random. Finds u, if it exists, such
that x = u~2 mod n. Because the calculation of u is













will produce x's that sometimes are and sometimes aren't
quadratic residues mod n.
References to n, x, and u, and optional integers
prime.product, always.max, and max.dig. If prime.product
is TRUE, n will be the product of two primes. The
default value is FALSE. If always.max is TRUE, n will
always be the maximum number of digits. The default
value if FALSE.
The values of n, x, and u, such that x = u"2 mod n. If




.method.two ( Big fcn, Big &x. Big fcu, int prime.product = 0,
































Reads n, x, and u from a file. This file contains x's
that are both quadratic residues and non-residues of n.
There are NUM.ENTRIES entries in this file.
References to n, x, and u, and optional integer
prime.product. If prime.product is TRUE, n will be the
product of two primes. The default value is FALSE.
The values of n, x, and u, such that x = u"2 mod n. If
is not a quadratic residue, u will be set to a random
value .
_three( Big fcn, Big ftx, Big fcu, int prime.product 0 );
sg.method.one
Vic inputs n, a, and m, such that a"m = 1 mod n. Randomly
choose k, and calculate b, such that a'k = b mod n.
Because of the way that the calculation is done, b will
always be a member of the subgroup of
Zn* generated by a.
n is restricted to MAX.DIGITS digits.
References to n, a, m, b, and k.
The values of n, a, m, b, and k, such that a'm 1 mod n,
a'k = b mod n.
//










Chooses n, a, and b at random, such that gcd(a.n) =
gcd(b.n) = 1. Finds m and k, if k exists, such that
a'm = 1 mod n and a'k = b mod n. Because the calculations
are slow, n is restricted to max.dig digits. This
function will produce b's that sometimes are and












void sg_method_two( Big fcn, Big &a, Big &m, Big ftk, Big &b,
int prime.product = 0, int always.max = 0,
int max.dig
= MAX.DIGITS.2 );
References to n, a, m, b, and k, and optional integers
prime.product, always.max, and max.dig. If prime.product
is TRUE, n will be the product of two primes. The default
value is FALSE. If always_max is TRUE, n will always
have max.dig digits. The default value is FALSE.
The values of n, a, m, b, and k, such that a'm = 1 mod n,
a'k = b mod n, and gcd(a.n) = gcd(b.n) = 1. If
















Reads n, a, m, k, and b from a file. This file contains
b
'
s that are both subgroup members and non-members . There
are NUM.ENTRIES entries in the file.
References to n, a, m, b, and k, and an optional integer
prime.product. If prime.product is TRUE, n will be the
product of two primes. The default value is FALSE.
The values of n, a, m, b, and k, such that a"m = 1 mod n,
a'k = b mod n, and gcd(a.n)
= gcd(b.n) =1. b is not a
subgroup member, k will be set to a random value.
three ( Big fcn, Big fca, Big ftm, Big fck, Big fcb,




The program quadres implements the zero-knowledge protocol for quadratic
residues in Figure 3.1. quadres is a simple shell script which simultaneously
runs the programs quadres_peggy and quadres.vic in separate X-terminals.
Name : quadres
Author: Molli Noland
Date: May 2, 1999
Description: This program runs the prover and verifier programs for
the perfect zero-knowledge proof for quadratic residues
simultaneously. The programs run in separate x-terms,
demonstrating the interaction between Peggy and Vic.
? This line initializes the signal file, in case the program has been
? run before.
echo "Peggy's COMPLETELY done" > quadres. signal;
? Run Peggy and Vic's programs in separate x-terms.
xterm -geometry 78x50+0+210 -sb -e quadres.vic fc



















Program which implements the prover 's side of a
zero-knowledge proof for quadratic residues.
Peggy's side of the correspondence. The program
always terminates in an infinite loop, so that the user
can review the contents of the window that it is run in.




Miracl precision (800 , 10) ;
Big n, x, v, y, z, u;
long seed;
int i, j, status, log2n, numdig, done, system.status ;






Initialization: Peggy declares what she is proving to Vic.
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// Peggy has to wait until Vic has written his answers, so that she
// can decide what she is going to prove.
done = 0;
while ( !done H
system.status = system( "grep Vic quadres. signal > quadres. sigout ") ;
signal. open ( "quadres. sigout", ios::in );
if( signal. peekO == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. close () ;
}
// Once she receives the signal, she reads Vic's message.
vic_message.open( "quadres.vic.msg", ios::in );
if( !vic_message H











// Peggy uses the information she received from Vic to decide what to
// prove.
irand( seed ) ;




one ( n, x, u, prime.product, always.max );
break;
case 2:
qr.method.two ( n, x, u, prime.product, always.max );
break;
case 3:
qr.method.three ( n, x, u, prime.product );
break;
default :
cout "Invalid selection. Default is Method l.\n\n";
qr.method.one ( n, x, u, prime.product, always.max );
break;
}
// Peggy outputs what she is proving.




" is a quadratic residue modulo
"
n endl;





cout "Peggy's message file could not be opened for writing, ";
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cotnum( n.getbigO, peggy_message );
cotnum( x.getbigO, peggy.message );
fclose( peggy.message );
// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is finished.
signal. open( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal H






signal "Peggy's done" endl;
signal. close0 ;
// Peggy has to wait until Vic has received this information.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = system( "grep Vic quadres . signal > quadres.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "quadres. sigout", ios::in );








log2n = bits (n) ;
status = 1;
while ( ( j












// Step 1A: Peggy chooses v, an element of Zn, at random, and
// then computes y
= v*2 mod n, and sends it to Vic.
//
// Peggy chooses v and computes y.
numdig
= ( brandO 7. MAX.DIGITS ) + 1;
v = rand( numdig, 10 ) 'I, n;
y
= pow( v, 2, n );




// Write y to a file for Vic to read.
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if( !( peggy_message = fopen( "quadres.peggy.msg",
"w"
) ) ){
cout "Peggy's message file could not be opened for writing, ";





cotnum( y.getbigO, peggy_message );
fclose ( peggy.message) ;
// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal H
cout "Signal file could not be opened for writing, quitting ";








signal. close () ;
//
// Step IC: Peggy wait's for Vic to send i, then Peggy computes
// z = u"i*v mod n, where u is a quadratic residue of
// x mod n. Peggy sends z to Vic.
//
// Peggy has to wait until Vic has written i, and then she reads it in.
done = 0;
while ( !done H
system.status = system( "grep Vic quadres . signal > quadres.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "quadres. sigout", ios::in );
if ( signal.peekO == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. close0 ;
}
// Peggy has received the signal, so she now reads the value of i.
vic.message. open ( "quadres.vic.msg", ios::in );
if( !vic.message H







vic.message. close () ;




// Peggy calculates z.
z = ((u'i) * v) 7. n;
cout "I set z =
"
z;












cotnum( z.getbigO, peggy_message );
fclose ( peggy.message );
// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is finished.
signal. open( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){








signal "Peggy's done" endl;
signal. close () ;
// Peggy needs the status of the Vic's check in Step D.
// She waits until he has sent the message.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = system( "grep Vic quadres . signal > quadres.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "quadres. sigout", ios::in );
if( signal. peek () == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. close0 ;
}
// Once he sends the message she reads the status .
vic.message. open ( "quadres.vic.msg", ios::in );
if( ! vic.message ){







vic.message. close () ;






















// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is completely finished.
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signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){
cout "Signal file could not be opened for writing, quitting ";
cout "now ! ! " endl ;
while (1);
>
signal "Peggy's COMPLETELY done" endl;
signal. close0 ;























Program which implements the verifier's side of a
zero-knowledge proof for quadratic residues.
The user needs to enter a seed to start the random number
generation, a number from 1 to 3 indicating the input
method, whether or not n is required to be the product
of two primes, and whether or not n is required to have
the maximum number of digits .
Vic's side of the correspondence. The program always
terminates in an infinite loop, so that the user can
review the contents of the window that it is run in.
To exit the program, close the window. The transcript
















n, x, y, z, tempi, temp2;
seed;
primes , range ;









Vic needs to answer a series of questions so that
Peggy can decide what to prove.
78
// A seed is needed to start the randomization process .
cout "Peggy needs a seed before she can decide what ";




// The verifier needs to decide what method, one, two, or three, Peggy
// will use to choose what she is going to prove. He also needs to
// decide if n needs to be the product of two primes or not. Descriptions
// of the methods are included with the functions that implement them.
//
cout "Which decision method is to be used? (1, 2, or 3): ";
cin method;
cout "Should n be the product of two primes? (y/n): ";
cin primes;
















// As long as Peggy is not getting the input from a file, she needs to
// know if n should have the maximum number of digits.
if ( method != 3 H
cout "Should n always contain the maximum number of digits? (y/n): ";
cin range;




















// Vic writes his answers to a file for Peggy to read.
vie
.message.open ( "quadres.vic.msg", ios::out );
if( ! vic.message ){











// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){
cout "Signal file could not be opened for writing, quitting ";








signal. close () ;
// Vic has to wait until Peggy has written n and x, so that he will know
// what she is trying to prove. Once she has done this, read in n and x.
done = 0;
while ( (done ){
system.status = system( "grep Peggy quadres . signal > quadres.
sigout"
);
signal . open( "quadres .
sigout"
, ios : : in ) ;
if( signal.peekO ==
'P'
) done = 1;
signal. close0 ;
}
// Once he receives the signal, he reads Peggy's message.
peggy.message,open ( "quadres.peggy.msgl,> ios:: in );
if( ! peggy.message){









clo e () ;









// Open the file to print the transcript to and print the inputs to
// the proof.
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fputs( "n = ", trans ) ;
cotnum( n.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "x = ", trans );




cout "Transcript file could not be opened. ";
cout "No transcript will be printed. \n";
}
// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){











// Step 1 : Repeat the process log n times .
//
j - U
log2n = bits(n) ;
status = 1;
while ( ( j













// Step IB: Vic receives y, and then Vic chooses i
- 0 or 1 at
// random, and sends i to Peggy.
//
// Vic waits until Peggy has written y, and then reads it in.
done - 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = system( "grep Peggy quadres . signal > quadres.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "quadres. sigout", ios:: in );
if( signal.peekO ==
'P'
) done = 1;
signal. close () ;
}
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// Once he receives the signal, he can read Peggy's message.
peggy.message.open ( "quadres.peggy.msg", ios::in);
if( ! peggy.message){








cout "Peggy sent y =
"
y;
// Vic chooses i
i brandO 7. 2;
cout "I set i =
"
i endl;
// Vic writes i to a file for Peggy to read.
vic.message. open ( "quadres.vic.msg", ios:: out );
if( ! vic.message ){







vic.message . close0 ;
// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){











// Step ID: Vic receives z, and then Vic checks that
// z"2 = x"i*y mod n. Returns true if the step is verified.
//
// Vic waits until Peggy has written z, and then reads it in.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system_status
= system( "grep Peggy quadres. signal > quadres.
sigout"
);








// Once he receives the signal, he reads Peggy's message.
peggy.messageopen ( "quadres.peggy .
msg"
,
ios : : in ) ;
if( ! peggy.message){








cout "Peggy sent z =
"
z;
// Vic performs the check.
tempi = (z"2) ;
temp2
- (x'i) * y;
// Print a message indicating the outcome of the check.
if ( ( tempi 7. n ) != ( temp2 7. n ) ){





















































// Print transcript of this round.
if( print.transcript ){
fputs( "\n", trans );
fprintf( trans, "y7.d
= ", j );
cotnum( y.getbigO, trans );
fprintf( trans, "i7.d
= 7.d\n", j, i );
fprintf( trans, "z7.d
= ", j );
cotnum( z.getbigO, trans );
}
// Vic writes the status of the check to a file for Peggy to read.
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vic_message.open( "quadres.vic.msg"
, ios:: out );
if( ! vic.message ){







vic.message . close0 ;
// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal", ios:: out );
if( ! signal ){






signal "Vic's done" endl;





// Step 2: Vic accepts Peggy's proof if Step D is verified
// in every round.
//

























// Close transcript file.
if( print.transcript ){
fclose ( trans ) ;
}

















This program implements the forging algorithm for the zero-knowledge proof




Program which implements a forging algorithm for the
zero-knowledge proof of quadratic residues. The
input to the program is given by the verifier.
The user must enter n and x, such that n and x axe
relatively prime.






const Big 0NE(1) ;
Big n, x, y, z, xinv;
long seed;
int i, j, log2n, numdig;
FILE *trans ;
// Get the inputs to the program.
cout "The inputs to this program are two integers n and x,\n";






// The gcd of x and n must be one, if it is not, there is not an
// inverse. The inverse is neccessary for the forging algorithm.
// If the gcd is not one, quit now!!
if( gcd(x.n) != ONE H
cout "The gcd of x and n is not one; and therefore the inverse
\n"
;




xinv = inverse(x.n) ;
}
// Need to get a seed from Vic to generate the transcript.
85






// Open the output file for the transcript.











// Step 1: Output n and x to the transcript.
//
fputs(
" \n", trans) ;




cotnum( n.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "x = ", trans ) ;
cotnum( x.getbigO, trans );
//
// Step 2: Repeat the generation of the triples log n times.
//
log2n = bits(n) ;
for( j
= 1; j
<= log2n; j++ H
//
// Steps 2A and 2B: Randomly generate i and z.
//
i = brandO 7. 2;
numdig
= ( brand0 7. MAX.DIGITS ) + 1;
z = rand( numdig, 10 ) 7. n;
//




= (z'2) 7. n;
if ( i == 1 ) y
= ( xinv * y ) 7. n;
//
// Step 2D: Output the
triple to the transcript.
//
fputs( "\n", trans );
fprintf( trans. "y7.d
= ", j );




, j, i );
fprintf ( trans , "z7.d
=
"
, j ) ;
cotnum( z.getbigO, trans );
}
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The program subgrp implements the zero-knowledge protocol for subgroup
membership in Figure 3.3. Like quadres, subgrp is a simple shell script which
simultaneously runs two programs subgrp_peggy and subgrp.vic.
Name : subgrp
Author: Molli Noland
Date: May 2, 1999
Description: This program runs the prover and verifier programs for
the perfect zero-knowledge proof for subgroup membership
simultaneously. The programs run in separate x-terms,
demonstrating the interaction between Peggy and Vic.





? Run Peggy and Vic's programs in separate x-terms.
xterm -geometry 78x50+0+210 -sb -e subgrp.vic fc















Program which implements the prover 's side of a
zero-knowledge proof of subgroup membership.
Peggy's side of the correspondence. The program
always terminates in an infinite loop, so that the user
can review the contents of the window that it is run in.




Miracl precision (800 , 10) ;
Big n, a, b, m, j, k, h, g;
long seed;
int i, 1, status, log2n, numdig, always.max;






Peggy declares what she is proving to Vic.
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// Peggy has to wait until Vic has written his answers , so that she
// can decide what she is going to prove.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = system( "grep Vic subgrp. signal > subgrp. sigout") ;
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios::in );
if ( signal.peekO == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. closeO ;
}
// Once Peggy receives the signal she reads Vic's message.
vic.message. open ( "subgrp.vic.msg", ios:: in );
if( ! vic.message ){
cout "Signal file could not be opened for reading, quitting ";










// She then uses the information she received from Vic to decide what
// to prove.
irand( seed ) ;
switch ( method ){
case 1:
sg.method.one ( n, a, m, k, b );
break;
case 2:
sg_method_two ( n, a, m, k, b, prime.product, always.max );
break;
case 3:
sg_method_three ( n, a, m, k, b, prime.product );
break;
default :
cout "Invalid selection. Default is Method l.\n\n";
sg.method.one ( n, a, m, k, b );
break;
}
// Peggy outputs what
she is proving.









" where n =
"
n endl;
// Write n, a, b, and m to a












cotnum( n.getbigO, peggy.message );
cotnum( a.getbigO, peggy.message );
cotnum( m.getbigO, peggy.message );
cotnumC b.getbigO, peggy.message );
fclose ( peggy.message );




if( ! signal ){






signal << "Peggy's done" endl;
signal. close0 ;
// Peggy has to wait until Vic has received this information.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = system( "grep Vic subgrp . signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios:: in );




// Step 1: Repeat the process log n times.
//
1 = 1;
log2n = bits(n) ;
status 1;












// Step 1A: Peggy chooses j, element of Zm, at random and computes
// g
=
a'j mod n, and sends g to Vic.
//
// Choose j and calculate g.
numdig
= ( brand0 7. MAX.DIGITS ) + 1;
j = rand( numdig, 10 ) 'I. m;
g
=
pow(a, j, n) ;
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// Write g to a file for Vic to read.













cotnum( g.getbigO, peggy.message );
fclose ( peggy.message );
// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is finished.
signal. open( "subgrp.
signal"
, ios:: out );
if( ! signal ){






signal "Peggy's done" endl;
signal. close0 ;
//
// Step IC: Peggy waits for Vic to send i, then she computes
// h = j + ik mod m, and sends h to Vic.
//
// Peggy has to wait until Vic has written i, and then she reads it in.
done = 0;
while ( ! done ) {
system.status = system( "grep Vic subgrp. signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios:: in );
if( signal. peekO == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. closeO ;
}
// Once Peggy receives the signal, she reads Vic's message.
vic.message. open ( "subgrp.vic.msg", ios:: in );
if( [vic.message ){







vic.message. close () ;
cout "Vic chose i =
"
i endl;
// Peggy calculates h.
h = ( j + i*k ) 7. m;




// Write h to a file for Vic to read.
if( !( peggy_message = fopen( "subgrp.peggy.msg",
"w"
) ) ){






cotnum( h.getbigO, peggy.message );
fclose ( peggy.message );
// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is finished.
signal. open( "subgrp. signal", ios::out );
if( ! signal ){






signal "Peggy's done" endl;
signal. close0 ;
// Peggy needs the status of the check. She has to wait until Vic
// sends the message, then she reads the status of the check.
done = 0;
while ( !done ){
system.status = systemC "grep Vic subgrp. signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios:: in );
if ( signal. peekO == 'V ) done = 1;
signal. close0 ;
}
// Once Peggy receives the signal, she reads Vic's message.
vic.message. open ( "subgrp.vic.msg", ios:: in );
if( ! vic.message M
cout "Signal file could not be opened for reading, quitting ";





























// Once this is done, she informs Vic that she is completely finished.
signal. open ( "quadres. signal"
, ios::out );
if( ! signal ){
cout "Signal file could not be opened for writing, quitting ";
cout "now ! ! " endl ;
while (1);
}
signal "Peggy's COMPLETELY done" endl;
signal. closeO ;






















Program which implements the verifier's side of a
zero-knowledge proof for subgroup membership.
The user needs to enter a seed to start the random number
generation, a number from 1 to 3 indicating the input
method, whether or not n is required to be the product
of two primes, and whether or not n is required to have
the maximum number of digits.
Vic's side of the correspondence. The program always
terminates in an infinite loop, so that the user can
review the contents of the window that it is run in.
To exit the program, close the window. The transcript





Miracl precision (800 , 10) ;
Big n, a, b, m, h, g, tempi, temp2;
long seed ;
int i, 1, status, log2n, system.status , done;
int print.transcript, method, prime.product;
int always.max = 0;
char primes , range ;






Vic needs to answer a series of questions so that
Peggy can decide what to prove.
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// Peggy needs to get a seed from Vic to decide what she is proving.
cout "Peggy needs a seed before she can decide what she
"
;




// Vic needs to decide what method, one, two, or three, Peggy
// will use to choose what she is going to prove. He also needs to
// decide if n needs to be the product of two primes or not.
// Descriptions of the methods are included with the functions that
// implement them.
//
cout "Which decision method is to be used? (1, 2, or 3): ";
cin method;
if ( ( method == 2 ) II ( method == 3 ) H
cout "Should n be the product of two primes? (y/n): ";
cin primes;


















// If Peggy needs to generate n, she needs to
know if n is required
// to contain the maximum number of digits.
if ( method == 2 ){



























// Vic writes his answers to a file for Peggy to read.
vic.message. open( "subgrp.vie.msg", ios::out );
if( ! vic.message ){







vic.message method << endl;
vic.message << prime.product endl;
vic.message << always.max endl;
vic.message. closeO ;
// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "subgrp. signal" , ios::out );
if( ! signal ){






signal << "Vic's done" endl;
signal. close () ;
// Vic has to wait until Peggy has written n, a, m, and b, so that he
// will know what she is trying to prove. Once she has done this,
// read in n, a, m, and b.
done - 0;
while ( !done H
system.status system( "grep Peggy subgrp. signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios:: in );
if( signal. peekO ==
'P' ) done = 1;
signal. close () ;
}
// Once Vic receives the signal, he reads Peggy's message.
peggy.message. open ( "subgrp.peggy.msg", ios::in );
if( ! peggy.message ){
cout "Peggy's message file could not be opened for reading, ";


























b = " b;

















fputs( "n = ", trans );
cotnumC n.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "a = ", trans );
cotnumC a.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "m = ", trans );
cotnumC m.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "b ", trans );





cout << "Transcript file could not be opened. ";




// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.




ifC ! signal ){
cout "Signal file could not be opened for writing, quitting ";










// Step 1: Repeat the
process log n times.
//
1 = 1;
log2n = bitsCn) ;
status
= 1;
















// Step IB: Vic waits to receive g, and then he chooses i = 0 or 1
// at random. He sends i to Peggy.
//
// Vic waits until Peggy has written g, and then reads it in.
done = 0;
while C ! done ) f
system.status = systemC "grep Peggy subgrp. signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. open ( "subgrp. sigout", ios:: in );
if( signal. peekO ==
'P'
) done = 1;
signal . closeO ;
}
// Once he receives the signal, Vi reads Peggy's message.
peggy.message.openC "subgrp.peggy .msg", ios:: in );
ifC ! peggy.message ){







peggy.message. clo eO ;




// Vic chooses i
i = brandO 7. 2;
cout "I set i =
"
i endl;
// Vic writes i to a file for Peggy to read.
vic.message. open( "subgrp.vic.msg", ios::out );
ifC ! vic_message ){








// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open C "subgrp. signal", ios::out );
ifC ! signal M











signal . closeO ;
//
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// Step ID: Vic waits to receive h, then he checks that
// a'h = b"i*g mod n.
//
// Vic waits until Peggy has written h, and then reads it in.
done = 0;
while C .'done ){
system_status = systemC "grep Peggy subgrp. signal > subgrp.
sigout"
);
signal. openC "subgrp. sigout", ios::in );
if ( signal.peekO == 'P' ) done = 1;
signal. close () ;
}
// Once Vic receives the signal, he reads Peggy's message.
peggy.message. openC "subgrp.peggy.msg", ios::in );
if( ! peggy.message ){







peggy.message. close () ;
cout "Peggy sent h =
"
h;
// Vic performs the check.
tempi = powCa, h, n) ;
temp2 = Cb'i) * g;
// Print out the outcome of the check.
if C tempi != (temp2 7. n) ){












IS NOT congruent to\n";
>
else{





































// Print transcript of this round
ifC print.transcript ){
fputsC "\n", trans ) ;
fprintfC trans, "g7.d = ", 1 );
cotnumC g.getbigO, trans );
fprintfC trans, "iV.d = 7.d\n", 1, i );
fprintfC trans, "h7.d = ", 1 );
cotnumC h.getbigO, trans );
>







ifC ! vic_message M








// Once this is done, he informs Peggy that he is finished.
signal. open ( "subgrp. signal", ios:: out );
if( ! signal ){













// Step 2: Vic accepts
Peggy's proof if Step D is verified
// in every round.
//
























// Close transcript file.
if( print.transcript ){
fclose ( trans ) ;
}





The program sgforge is an implementation of the forging algorithm for the













Program which implements a forging algorithm for the
zero-knowledge proof of subgroup membership.
The values of n, a, b, and m, such that a'm 1 mod n,
and b and n are relatively prime.









Miracl precision (800, 10) ;
const Big ONE(l);
Big n, a, b, m, h, g, binv;
long seed ;
int i, j, log2n, numdig;
FILE *trans ;
// Get the inputs to the program.
cout "The inputs to this program are four integers n, a, b, and m,\n";











// Peggy checks that a'm
= 1 mod n; if not the input was invalid.
// NOTE: There is an ERROR here when n is an odd
multiple of five!!
if ( powC a, m, n )
!= ONE H





// The gcd of b and n must be one, if it is not, there
is not an
// inverse. The inverse is neccessary for the forging
algorithm. If




cout "The gcd of b and n is not one; and therefore the inverse
\n"




binv = inverse (b,n) ;
>
// Need to get a seed from Vic to generate the transcript.




// Open the output file for the transcript.
ifC !( trans = fopen( "sgforge. trans",
"a"
) ) ){













fputs( "n = ", trans );
cotnumC n.getbigO, trans );
fputs( "a = ", trans );
cotnumC a.getbigO, trans )
fputs( "b = ", trans );
cotnumC b.getbigO, trans )
fputs ( "m =
"
, trans ) ;
cotnumC m.getbigO, trans )
//
// Step 2: Repeat the generation of the triples log n times.
//
log2n = bits(n) ;
for( j
= 1; j
<= log2n; j++ ){
//
// Steps 2A and 2B: Randomly generate h and i.
//
numdig
= ( brand0 7. MAX.DIGITS ) + 1;
h - randC numdig, 10 ) 7, m;
i = brandO 7. 2;
//
// Step 2C: Calculate g
= a"h*invCb"i) mod n.
//
g
= powCa, h, n) ;
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if ( i == 1 ) g
= ( binv * g ) 7. n;
//
// Step 2D: Output the triple to the transcript.
fputsC "\n'\ trans );
fprintfC trans, "g7.d = ", j );
cotnumC g.getbigO, trans );
fprintfC trans, "i7.d = 7.d\n", j, i );
fprintfC trans, "h7.d = ", j );
cotnumC h.getbigO, trans );
}





The program genfile creates the files used by the third input method for both
quadres and subgrp.
//
// Name: genfile. cpp
// Author: Molli Noland
// Date: May 2, 1999
// Description: Creates a file used by Method 3 of quadres or subgrp.
// Options include the maximum number of digits in n and
// if it is necessary for n to be a product of primes.
// Arguments: The program takes three arguments:
// 1. An integer saying which files to generate.
// 1 quadres, 2 subgrp, or 3 both?
// 2. The maximum number of digits for n Cl to 100).
// 3. If n needs to be the product of two primes Cy/n) .
// 4. If n is always max ? of digits Cy/n).






int mainC int argc, char* argv[] ){
Miracl precisionC800,10) ;
int program, max.dig, prime.product, i, always.max;
char primes ;
Big n, x, u, a, b, m, k;
FILE *file;
// Check that the correct number of arguments were passed in.
// If not, print the usage information.
ifC argc != 6 ){






<files> is 1 quadres, 2 subgrp, or 3 both,\n";
cout




" <prime_product> indicates if n needs to be the product";
cout
"








" <seed> is positive integer for random number generation. \n";
return 0;
}
// Find out if we are creating a file for quadres for subgrp, or for
// both.
program = atoiC argv[l] ) ;
if C C program < 1 ) II C program > 3 ) ) {
program = 3;




// Find out the maximum number of digits in n, between 1 and 100.
max.dig
=
atoiC argv [2] );
ifC ( max.dig > 100 ) || C max.dig < 1 ) ){
max.dig
= MAX.DIGITS.2;
cout "Invalid ? of digits. ";




// Determine which file to create based on if n is required to be the
// product of two primes.
ifC ( C argv [3] [0] == 'N' ) | | C argv [3] [0] == 'n' ) ) fcft
( argv[3][l] == '\0' ) H
prime.product = 0;
}




prime.product = 1 ;
}
elsef
cout "Invalid answer to the question, if n must be the product\n";





// Determine if n is to always be the maximum number of digits or not.
ifC C C argv[4][0] ==
'N'








else if ( ( ( argv[4][0] ==
'Y'









cout "Invalid answer to the question, if n must be the maximum\n";





// If n must be the product of primes , then max.digits must be greater
// than 1.
if C ( prime.product ) ftfc ( max.dig
== 1 ) ){











// Start the randomization process.
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irandC atolC argv [5] ) );
// Create the quadres file if we are suppose to.
if ( ( program == 1 ) II ( program == 3 ) ) {
// Open the file.
if( prime.product ){
ifC !( file = fopenC "quadres. primes " ,
"w"
) ) ){







ifC !( file = fopenC "quadres. input",
"w"
) ) ){






// Create the quadres file.
forC i = 0; i < NUM.ENTRIES; i++ ){
qr.method.two C n, x, u, prime.product, always.max, max.dig );
// Output n, x, and u to the file.
cotnumC n.getbigO, file );
cotnumC x.getbigO, file );
cotnumC u.getbigO, file );
fputsC "\n", file );
}
fclose C file ) ;
}
// Create the subgrp file if we are suppose to.
if ( C program == 2 ) II C program == 3 ) ) {
// Open the file.
if( prime.product H
ifC !( file = fopenC "subgrp.primes",
"w"
) ) ){







ifC !( file = fopenC "subgrp. input",
"w"
) ) ){







// Create the subgrp file.
forC i = 0; i < NUM.ENTRIES; i++ ){
sg.method.two C n, a, m, k, b, prime.product, always.max, max.dig );
// Output n, a, m, k, and b to the file.
cotnumC n.getbigO, file );
cotnumC a.getbigO, file ):
cotnumC m.getbigO, file )
cotnumC k.getbigO, file );
cotnumC b.getbigC), file );
fputsC "\n", file );
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